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This paper analyzes the interaction of trade policy with the vertical structures of foreign rms
exporting goods to the United States, focusing on the case of antidumping duties. I use a model
that incorporates both vertical structure and the dynamics of U.S. antidumping duties to show that
the policy has a notably dierent impact on vertically integrated and non-integrated foreign rms. I
then successfully test the theoretical predictions using data on 489 antidumping cases. In particular,
I nd that non-integrated rms are more likely than vertically integrated rms to exit the U.S.
market following the imposition of duties, and less likely to pass the duties on to consumers for
certain products. My empirical ndings also indicate that antidumping duties oscillate between low
and high levels - a previously unnoticed, surprising and most-likely unintended consequence of the
design of U.S. antidumping policy that is nevertheless predicted by my model.
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Antidumping duties are aimed at protecting domestic industry from the sale of imports at less than a
\fair" value. As illustrated by Figure 1, the number of countries with antidumping laws has increased
dramatically in the last two decades. This increase is correlated with the rise in World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) membership. Because members of the WTO must limit the use of import taris, they
have come to rely on antidumping duties.1 In the United States alone, there were 280 antidumping
measures in force as of July 2005.2 Gallaway, Blonigen, and Flynn (1999) estimated the annual net
welfare cost of U.S. antidumping and countervailing duties to be $4 billion using 1993 data.
The same period has also seen a sharp increase in the integration of rms across country borders.
Intra-rm trade made up 37% of U.S. imports in 1982, increasing to 52% in 2000.3 Though this
development has been widely noted by economists, little attention has been paid to the impact of
increased international integration on trade policy.
I argue that the increasing share of intra-rm trade has important implications for the outcomes
of antidumping policy. Intra-rm transactions pose a particular challenge for antidumping duties and
similar trade policies that target foreign export prices. Specically, when the foreign producer is
vertically integrated with the domestic importer, the export price is an internal transfer price, which
the foreign producer can manipulate. In response to this possibility, U.S. antidumping law treats foreign
producers that are vertically integrated with their domestic importers - henceforth integrated foreign
producers - dierently than foreign producers that are not integrated with the U.S. importer - henceforth
non-integrated foreign producers. As a consequence of this dierent treatment, the incentives of foreign
producers facing antidumping actions dier by their vertical structure. I construct a dynamic pricing
model to formalize these claims for U.S. antidumping duties. I then test the predictions of the model
using comprehensive data on antidumping duties in the United States. I nd that the vertical structure
of foreign producers with their domestic importers has a stark impact on the response to antidumping
duties. These ndings indicate that accounting for rm vertical structure is an important ingredient
in developing a more complete understanding of the impacts of antidumping policy on import prices
and import volumes, and consequently on the incomes and employment of import-competing factors
as well.
The model I develop incorporates both vertical structure and the dynamics of U.S. antidumping
duties. Here the institutional details play a key role. For a non-integrated foreign producer, the
antidumping duty is based on the dierence between the assessed \fair-value" price (roughly, the
producer's home market price) and the producer's U.S. export price in the prior period. The duty
is paid by the importer. For an integrated foreign producer, the antidumping duty is based on the
dierence between the fair-value price and the producer's U.S. consumer price in the prior period, with
1See Prusa (2005) for a discussion of antidumping proliferation.
2WTO, Report of The Committee on Antidumping Practices, November 2005 (G/L/758).
3Bureau of Economic Analysis, Total U.S. Trade in Goods and Intrarm Trade in Goods, 1977-94. https://www.bea.
gov/international/datatables/0297iid/table1.htm and Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2005)
1the duty paid by the producer. The retroactive calculation of the duties creates a feedback loop from
past pricing behavior to current duty adjustments.
An immediate implication of these rules is that if an integrated and a non-integrated producer
each face the same duty level and each make pricing decisions that ultimately lead to identical U.S.
consumer prices, then the non-integrated producer will face a higher antidumping duty in the following
period. The rst prediction of my model is thus that, all else being equal, an antidumping duty will
have a bigger eect on protability, and will thus be more likely to induce exit from the market, for a
non-integrated foreign producer.
A second, subtler prediction of the model concerns the dynamics of duty adjustment. I show
that imposing antidumping duties generates one of two outcomes for integrated foreign producers:
either they cease dumping immediately, or else their duties oscillate over time until they converge to
steady-state dumping. The behavior of non-integrated foreign producers depends on the shape of the
consumer demand curve. If consumer demand is suciently convex, a non-integrated producer either
ceases dumping immediately, or sets export prices so that duties oscillate and ultimately converge to
steady-state dumping. If consumer demand is not too convex, the non-integrated producer sets export
prices so that duties monotonically decrease to a steady-state, with or without dumping.
These dierent dynamics arise because of the incentives provided by the feedback-loop nature of
antidumping duties. An integrated foreign producer can choose the U.S. consumer price directly, and
hence faces a simple tradeo. Specically, a higher duty today acts as a cost shifter, and provides a
static incentive to raise the U.S. consumer price, leading in turn to a lower duty tomorrow. The result
is oscillation of duties and prices over time. The non-integrated foreign producer, by contrast, cannot
choose the U.S. consumer price directly, but it can in
uence the U.S. consumer price indirectly under
the retroactive nature of U.S. antidumping law by manipulating its foreign export price over time. As a
consequence, for a non-integrated foreign producer, the static incentive created by a higher duty today
depends on the curvature of consumer demand - this is because the duties are paid by the independent
importer and hence act as a demand shifter. If a higher duty creates a static incentive to raise price,
the result is oscillation, otherwise the model predicts monotonic convergence to a steady state.
The third prediction of the model concerns the steady-state incentives to pass duties on to con-
sumers. I show that, the higher the elasticity of demand at or around steady-state, the more the U.S.
consumer price of the integrated foreign producer responds to duty changes. Intuitively, since higher
demand elasticity implies lower price margins over marginal costs, the U.S. consumer price of the inte-
grated foreign producer responds more to duty (cost) changes when demand is more elastic. The reverse
is true for the non-integrated foreign producer: when demand is more elastic, the non-integrated foreign
producer has to change its export price by less to achieve the desired level of demand. As a result,
foreign export prices and U.S. consumer prices respond less to duty changes around steady-state when
demand is more elastic there.
In order to test these three predictions, I construct a detailed dataset of all U.S. antidumping duties
2imposed between 1980 and 1995. The data support the model's rst prediction, showing that non-
integrated rms are almost twice as likely as integrated rms to exit the U.S. market once antidumping
duties are imposed.
Second, the data indicate that U.S. antidumping duties tend to oscillate over time for both integrated
and non-integrated foreign producers. This conrms the model's prediction for integrated producers
and is also consistent with its prediction for non-integrated producers, under the assumption that
demand is suciently convex. This result is interesting because it runs counter to assumptions in
earlier theoretical work. It also contradicts a \naive" expectation that rms will respond to antidumping
duties by increasing their prices to the fair-value price. My empirical ndings hence identify a previously
unnoticed, surprising and most-likely unintended consequence of the design of U.S. antidumping policy
that is nevertheless predicted by my model. These non-fundamental reasons for price oscillation suggest
the potential for welfare losses, although my data do not allow me to assess that directly.
I also conrm the other component of the model's second prediction: the potential for rms to
immediately cease dumping once antidumping duties are imposed. Because revocation of the duties
takes time, this requires a careful analysis of the data to determine when dumping ceased. Taken
together, the ndings conrm the model's second prediction for integrated foreign producers. The
ndings also conrm the second prediction for non-integrated foreign producers, provided that one
accepts the assumption that demand is suciently convex.
Finally, I examine the two components of the third prediction: that a higher elasticity of demand at
steady-state makes the integrated producer's U.S. consumer prices more responsive to duty changes, but
makes non-integrated producers' prices less responsive to duty changes. I approach this examination
in two ways. First, I presume that steel has higher demand elasticity than other intermediate products
in my data, while nished products have lower demand elasticities. I nd that U.S. consumer prices of
integrated foreign producers responded more to duty changes for steel than for other goods. I also nd
that U.S. consumer prices of integrated producers responded less to duty changes for nished products
than for other goods, while the prices of non-integrated foreign producers responded more for nished
products.4
However, the classication of products in my data into these categories may be too broad and thus
inaccurate. Hence, I make another attempt at assessing the impact of higher demand elasticities on
the pass-through of antidumping duties. In particular, I use Broda and Weinstein (2006)'s estimates of
(import) demand elasticities to dene a binary variable that equals 1 for products with \high" demand
elasticities. I nd that the prices of non-integrated foreign producers responded less to duty changes
when demand elasticity was high, while the prices of integrated foreign producers responded more.
To the extent that my measure of high demand elasticity is accurate, these ndings conrm the third
theoretical prediction.
The paper's ndings contribute to the literatures on antidumping duties and the role of multina-
4I classify the products in the data into four mutually exclusive commodity groups: steel, chemicals, nished products
(including food) and all other intermediates.
3tionals in international trade. The theoretical model I consider builds on work by Blonigen and Park
(2004), who were the rst to analyze the dynamics of pricing for a non-integrated foreign producer
faced with antidumping duties. But they do not examine the dynamic time path of antidumping duties
over time, nor do they consider the distinction between integrated and non-integrated foreign rms.
By contrast, the distinction between integrated and non-integrated foreign rms is central to my work:
extending the model to consider vertically integrated rms gives rise to a new set of theoretical and
empirical predictions that I am able to test successfully. Taken together, the two papers suggest that a
number of aspects of the empirical data on antidumping duties can be well explained by a simple and
consistent optimal pricing model.
Less directly, the paper relates to a large literature on antidumping duties and their impact on
import volumes, domestic production and prices (e.g. Finger (1981), Herander and Schwartz (1984),
Salvatore (1987), Staiger and Wolak (1994), Harrison (1991), Blonigen and Haynes (2002) and Prusa
(1997)).
Although this paper is among the rst to relate vertical structure to the eects of trade policy,
there has been substantial recent work on the broader role of vertical structure in trade patterns (e.g.
Grossman and Helpman (2002), Antr as and Helpman (2004) and Antr as and Helpman (2008), and
recent empirical papers by Antr as (2003) and Nunn and Tre
er (2008)). This literature strives to
understand the implications of the rise of multinational rms for the world economy. My paper is part
of a small and growing literature on the implications of multinationals for trade policy (Ornelas and
Turner (2008a), Ornelas and Turner (2008b), Antr as and Staiger (2008) and D ez (2008)). One nice
feature of antidumping duties for examining the interaction of trade policy and vertical structure is
that they highlight the potential for diering treatment of dierent types of producers. My theoretical
ndings indicate why this might have real consequences, and the empirical results suggest that indeed
there are some dierences in the response of integrated and non-integrated producers to antidumping
duties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I brie
y explain U.S. antidumping policy
and highlight the main characteristics of the process. The design of antidumping policy is incorporated
into the theoretical model that is developed and discussed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data
used in this paper. The predictions of the model are tested in Section 5 and Section 6 oers conclusions
and discussion of future research.
2 U.S. Antidumping Procedures
This section describes how the U.S. government calculated and assessed antidumping duties throughout
the data period of 1980 to 1995, during which there were no major changes to U.S. antidumping duty
law or to the method of calculating the duties. The exposition highlights how the method of calculating
duties diers for vertically integrated and non-integrated foreign producers.
42.1 U.S. Antidumping Procedure for Non-Integrated Foreign Producers
Antidumping investigations are usually initiated by domestic producers' submitting a petition. Two
government agencies are involved in the investigation. The Department of Commerce determines
whether the product was \dumped," i.e. whether the product was sold in the United States for less than
\fair-value." The International Trade Commission determines whether the imports under investigation
caused or may cause a \material injury" to the domestic industry.
The determination of dumping by the Department of Commerce is an extremely involved process.
For a foreign producer that is not vertically integrated with the domestic importer (non-integrated
foreign producer), the dumping margin is dened as the percentage dierence between the \fair-value"
price and the foreign producer's export price. The dumping margin hinges upon Commerce's fair-value
price determination. In principle, the fair-value price is based on the consumer price of the foreign
rm's product in its own market. However, if Commerce determines that these sales are inadequate
(e.g. quantities are \too small" or prices are \too low"), the fair-value price is instead based on the
rm's third-country sales or on \constructed value." Constructed value is calculated using various
costs related to the rm's production and sales in the United States, and requires extremely detailed
data from the foreign producers. If Commerce deems the information supplied by the foreign rm
unsatisfactory, it can resort to instead using the \best information available." The \best information
available" often uses information supplied by domestic petitioners, which is unfavorable for the foreign
rm, generally resulting in high duty margins.
Antidumping duties are imposed only if both nal determinations are positive: if Commerce nds
dumping and the International Trade Commission nds material injury.5 The entire investigation is
limited by legislation to last no more than 10 to 14 months. If the investigation ends in a positive
determination, the foreign producer is assessed a duty equal to the dumping margin calculated by
Commerce, but remains free to choose its own price.
In every subsequent year, any interested party can ask Commerce for a review of the duties.6 An
interested party might be a foreign rm subject to duties, one of the original petitioners, or another
U.S. rm. Commerce publishes a revised duty level at the end of the review. If no party asks for a
review, the duty remains unchanged from its previous level. An antidumping order can be terminated
if three consecutive reviews nd no dumping by the foreign producer. The duty can also be revoked
upon lack of interest from the domestic industry or (since 1995) through \Sunset reviews," which occur
every ve years starting from the original order date.
Since antidumping duties are based on past prices, they necessarily lag after actual prices. An-
tidumping duties for the non-integrated foreign producer are based on the dierence, during the months
of the investigation or review period, between the producer's foreign export price and its fair-value price.
5In some instances the foreign rm can reach an agreement with Commerce to raise its price voluntarily, in which case
the investigation is terminated. A terminated investigation can be reopened at any time. In practice, very few terminated
investigations are reopened.
6Until 1985, the reviews were automatically performed on a yearly basis.
5The antidumping duty rate for a non-integrated foreign producer in period t is:




Total duty payments are calculated by multiplying the duty rate (as a percentage) by the value
of the imported goods. Under U.S. law, the domestic importer is liable for all duty payments. The
importer usually deposits cash, a bond or another security to cover estimated duty payments on all
subsequently imported merchandise. The deposit is based on the most recent duty rate. When an
administrative review takes place, an updated duty rate is calculated retroactively, based on actual
prices during the review period. The importer is then reimbursed or charged for the dierence between
past estimated payments and the payment due based on the review's outcome.
2.2 U.S. Antidumping Procedure for Integrated Foreign Producers
Most aspects of antidumping policy are identical for integrated and non-integrated foreign producers.
There are, however, two important exceptions.
The rst is how the dumping margin is calculated. For an integrated foreign producer, the export
price is an internal transfer price and is not used in the calculation of the duty. Since the integrated
rm sells directly to U.S. consumers, the antidumping duty for the integrated foreign producer is based
instead on the dierence between its U.S. consumer price and its fair-value price.7 The antidumping
duty for an integrated foreign producer in period t is thus:




Two things should be noted when comparing equation (2) with equation (1). First, the numerators are
identical: although the fair-value price is perhaps arbitrary, it does not depend on the vertical structure
of the foreign producer. Second, the denominators are dierent: each expresses the price at which the
product leaves the hands of the foreign producer upon reaching the United States. For a non-integrated
foreign producer, the denominator is the foreign export price. For an integrated producer, it is the U.S.
consumer price.
A second dierence between integrated and non-integrated foreign producers is in the liability for
duty payments. In principle, the duty is always paid by the importing entity. An integrated foreign
producer is thus liable for duty payments, while the independent domestic importer (and not the foreign
producer) pays the duty in the absence of integration.8;9
The theoretical model that follows examines how the design of antidumping policy aects foreign
producers' responses when duties are imposed. It oers several predictions that are tested empirically
in a later section.
719 USCS x1677a.
819 CFR x353.26.
9Since 1998, the independent foreign producer can also pay the duties under certain circumstances. This change is not
analyzed here due to data limitations.
63 Theory: Pricing in The Presence of Antidumping Policy
The theoretical model developed here examines pricing behavior of integrated and non-integrated for-
eign producers in the presence of antidumping duties. I rst present a static pricing model that provides
basic intuition for the dierences between the two. Next, I introduce a dynamic model that takes into
account that present antidumping duties are calculated based on past prices. I compare both the dy-
namic equilibrium path and the steady-state of the dynamic model, with the static model, to shed light
on how the dynamics of duty policies aect the incentives and the behavior of foreign producers.10
3.1 Setup
I assume that the import sector is fully competitive and that the foreign producer is a monopoly (with
no strategic interactions) facing an innite horizon.11 For simplicity, the importer's sole function is
distribution, assumed to incur zero cost. The foreign producer has constant marginal costs equal to c.
Domestic demand is represented by D(p), where p is the (U.S.) consumer price. I assume the following:
(A1) D is continuous, twice-dierentiable, and strictly decreasing on [0;p] where D(p) = 0.
(A2) The foreign rm has an incentive to dump, i.e., optimal price in the absence of antidumping
policy is less than the fair-value price.
I also assume that all second order conditions necessary for prot maximization hold.
In each period t, a non-integrated foreign producer sets foreign export price p
t and the importer
determines the U.S. consumer price pt. An integrated foreign producer sets the U.S. consumer price pt
directly.
As noted in Section 2.1, the fair-value price is, in principle, based on the foreign rm's home-market
price. I denote the fair-value price as FVt. Below, I assume that the foreign market price is given by
FVt = FV for all periods t.12
3.2 Static Model of The Eects of Antidumping Duties on Pricing
In this section, I abstract from the dynamic component of the policy by assuming that the antidumping
duty is based on current prices (rather than past prices). Hence, for now, I drop the time subscript t.
10 In Appendix B, I consider the model with retroactive adjustments made between the original duty assessed and the
actual duty calculated and prorated for that period. I show that qualitatively, the incentives and the behavior of foreign
producers do not change with the addition of adjustment payments. In particular, the testable predictions of the model
are unaltered.
11As in Blonigen and Park (2004), I use partial equilibrium analysis.
12Gallaway, Blonigen, and Flynn (1999) note several reasons why the majority of price changes aecting antidumping
duties in the review process occur within domestic (U.S.) price and not foreign price. The primary reason is the discretion
of Commerce to discard \below-cost" foreign market sales or replace foreign market price with third-country price or
constructed value. Thus, even if the foreign producer lowers foreign market price there is no guarantee that the duty
will be reduced. In general, antidumping policy is aimed at encouraging foreign rms to increase their U.S. price, not to
reduce their own home market price which has no eect on the U.S. marke. (p.219-220)
7Using equations (1) and (2) (both without the time subscript) and the notation above, I can
explicitly express the static antidumping duty as:
 =
8
> > > <
> > > :
FV
p   1; if the foreign producer is non-integrated and p  FV ;
FV
p   1; if the foreign producer is integrated and p  FV ;
0; Otherwise.
(3)
Under the assumption that antidumping duties are based on current prices, the duty for the non-
integrated foreign producer is equal to the percentage dierence between its foreign export price and
its fair-value price. By contrast, the duty for the integrated foreign producer is equal to the percentage
dierence between its current U.S. consumer price and its fair-value price.
3.2.1 Non-Integrated Foreign Producers and Domestic Importers
Consider the optimal price choice for the non-integrated foreign producer. Since the import sector is
fully competitive, the consumer price p must equal the marginal costs of the importer. Recall from
section 2.1 that the domestic importer pays the duties in the absence of vertical integration. Using
equation (3), it follows that the U.S. consumer price is:





p p = FV; p  FV ;
(1 + 0)p = p; Otherwise.
(4)
Equation (4) indicates that, in the static setting considered here, dumping by the non-integrated foreign
producer has no impact on U.S. consumer price. Note that the foreign producer will never set its export
price above the fair-value price. By denition, antidumping duties are zero for prices equal to or higher
than fair-value price. But when duties are zero then, by (A2), prots are decreasing for prices equal to
or higher than fair-value. Consequently, it is never optimal to set the export price above the fair-value.
To see dumping's lack of impact on consumer price, denote the non-integrated producer's optimal
export price, assuming static antidumping duties, by p
N. Since p
N  FV , the non-integrated foreign
producer will never nd it optimal to reduce its export price below fair-value. From equation (4) it
follows that, even if export price is set below fair-value, U.S. consumer price will remain unchanged at
p = FV , and demand will be xed at D(FV ). Lowering export price will merely create a transfer from
the foreign producer to the U.S. government. Hence, we have:
Proposition 3.1 The static optimal export price of the non-integrated foreign producer with antidump-
ing duties equals the fair-value price: p
N = FV .
In the static model, it is never optimal for the non-integrated foreign producer to dump in the
presence of antidumping duties, since setting prices below fair-value cannot aect the level of the U.S.
consumer price.
83.2.2 Integrated Foreign Producers
I now consider the optimization problem that faces an integrated foreign producer, whose export price
is an internal transfer price (cf. Section 2.2) and whose U.S. consumer price is used instead of the






p   1; if p  FV ;
0; Otherwise.






1+; if p  FV ;
p; Otherwise.
However, from (A2) we know that the integrated foreign producer will never set the U.S. consumer
price above fair-value (because prots are decreasing in prices at or above the fair-value price). Hence




; for p  FV . (5)
As equation (5) indicates, the integrated foreign producer can set its U.S. consumer price below fair-
value, at the cost of paying higher antidumping duties. Intuitively, if demand is suciently elastic at the
fair-value price, the foreign producer can prot by undercutting the fair-value price and absorbing the
duty it would incur. On the other hand, antidumping duties increase an integrated foreign producer's
costs, so its optimal price will be higher than the optimal price without antidumping policy. Denote
the optimal U.S. consumer price of the integrated foreign producer with static antidumping duties by
pI, and let ^ pI denote the integrated producer's optimal static U.S. consumer-price in the absence of
antidumping policy. The above argument can be formalized as follows:
Proposition 3.2 The static optimal price of the integrated foreign producer with antidumping duties
is equal to the fair-value price, pI = FV , only if consumer demand at the fair-value price is not too
elastic. Otherwise, ^ pI < pI < FV .
Proof See Appendix A
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 highlight a principal dierence in the response of integrated and non-
integrated foreign producers to antidumping duties. The latter has no control over U.S. consumer
price in this scenario. The integrated foreign producer, however, maintains full control over its U.S.
consumer-price, and can choose the price that maximizes its prots.
93.3 Dynamic Model of The Eects of Antidumping Duties on Pricing
I now add dynamics to the model introduced in the previous section. I focus on the retroactive
calculation of U.S. antidumping duties, and ignore retroactive adjustment-payments. In Appendix B,
I demonstrate that accounting for these payments does not alter the main predictions.
The model builds on Blonigen and Park (2004), with two important exceptions: (1) allowing foreign
producers to be integrated with domestic importers and (2) incorporating antidumping policy's dier-
ential treatment of integrated and non-integrated foreign producers into the analysis. I refrain from
making any a priori assumptions on the curvature of market demand, and I add an explicit analysis of
the foreign producer's exit decision in the face of antidumping duties.
3.3.1 Antidumping Duties and Enforcement
Because U.S. antidumping duties are retroactive, foreign producers face a dynamic optimization prob-
lem: current prices aect future duty levels.
Let t denote the antidumping duty level in period t. Let p
t and pt denote the foreign export price
and the U.S. consumer price in period t. Using equations (1)and (2) and the preceding notation, the
duty in period t can be expressed as follows:
t =
8
> > > <




t 1   1; if the foreign producer is non-integrated and p
t 1  FV ;
(pt 1) = FV
pt 1   1; If the foreign producer is integrated and pt 1  FV ;
0; Otherwise.
(6)
Before embarking on a formal analysis, it is helpful to explore how the simple static model above
is aected by the introduction of retroactive antidumping duties. This exercise allows me to point
out exactly how the retroactive duties impact the behavior of non-integrated versus integrated foreign
producers, compared to duties in the static model. The comparison provides important insights into
the complex dynamic problem foreign producers face.
For non-integrated foreign producers, consumer price equals the marginal cost of the importer.
Using (6), we can write:

















Once retroactive antidumping duties are introduced, the U.S. consumer price no longer equals the
fair-value price for p < FV . This contrasts with the static model above, where antidumping duties
cause the U.S. consumer price always to be equal to the fair-value price. With retroactive antidumping





t 1). The non-integrated foreign producer can control the U.S. consumer price through
its choice of export prices over time. For example, if the non-integrated foreign producer lowers its




t 1 < 1, then the current domestic
consumer price will be less than fair-value, as (7) indicates.






pt 1   1; if pt 1  FV ;
0; Otherwise.
(8)






1+t; if pt 1  FV ;
pt 1; Otherwise.
In the static model, the integrated foreign producer faces a trade-o between its current U.S.
consumer-price and the current level of antidumping duties set by policy. When duties are retroactive,
lower current consumer price entails a higher duty in the next period, as (9) indicates.
This discussion highlights an important dierence between integrated and non-integrated foreign
producers in the dynamic model. If an integrated foreign producer wishes to lower its current domestic
consumer price, it must pay higher duties in the next period. By contrast, if a non-integrated foreign
producer wants to lower its current domestic consumer price, it must decrease its current export price
below the previous period's level.
In order to study the dynamic problem of the foreign producers, I assume that the enforcement of
the initial antidumping duty is uncertain, but that once antidumping duties are imposed for the rst
time, their enforcement is certain from then on.13 Since my model studies the feedback-loop mechanism
of duty updates, I focus on the behavior of rms once the duties are imposed.14 In fact, it can be shown
that the optimal price of the foreign producers in all pre-duty periods is constant: if no investigation
has ever occurred, or if previous investigations ended in negative determinations, the foreign producer
faces the same optimization problem and keeps its price unchanged.
Given that all pre-duty periods are similar, I treat them as one period: period 0. If antidumping
duties are imposed, they are in eect in my analysis from period 1 on. With uncertain initial enforce-
ment, both integrated and non-integrated foreign producers will do more dumping initially (in period
0) than at steady-state in the presence of antidumping duties.15
3.3.2 The Dynamic Optimization Problem of The Non-Integrated Foreign Producer
I begin the formal analysis with the dynamic optimization problem of the non-integrated foreign pro-
ducer. Given a discount factor  2 [0;1], the non-integrated foreign producer's optimization problem,
13Blonigen and Park (2004) make the same assumption. Because of the policy's design, even when Commerce nds
dumping in the investigation, the enforcement of initial duties is uncertain and depends on the injury determination of
the International Trade Commission. Subsequent reviews of the order do not involve a renewed injury determination.
14This is in contrast to Blonigen and Park (2004), who examine how initial dumping is aected by the ex-ante probability
assigned to being caught.
15Proposition 2 in Blonigen and Park (2001) has a formal proof for the non-integrated case. The proof for the integrated
case is similar.
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where FV and p
0 are taken as given, and the U.S. consumer price equals the marginal cost of the
importer.
















Since, by U.S. antidumping law, the independent importer must pay the duties in the absence of
integration, the duties act as a demand-shifter for the non-integrated foreign producer.





current U.S. consumer price. Since the previous export price determines the current duty level, the
ratio of current to past export price is determined by the impact of the current duty on the optimal
export price. Recall that marginal prots equal the derivative of the prot function by the export price
p
t. The relation between the optimal export price and the current duty can thus be assessed by taking
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t   c)[1 + (p
t 1)]D00: (11)
The sign of the derivative in (11) equals the sign of the derivative of the optimal export price by the
duty.16 The derivative in (11) also indicates that the curvature of the demand function will determine







t 1)]), then derivative in (11) is negative, and so the optimal export price
decreases in the duty.17 If demand is suciently convex then the optimal export price increases in the
duty. These conditions characterize the relation between present and future prices.
The assumption that the marginal prots are decreasing in the duty is illustrated in Figure 2(a):
the prots decrease more in the export price when the duties are higher. When the duty level increases,
so does the cost of raising the export price: thus, the non-integrated foreign producer never increases
its export price in response to an increase in duties, nor does it decrease its export price in response to
a decrease in duties.
Consequently, a higher past export-price will lead to a further increase in current export price so




t 1 > FV . Similarly, a lower past export price will lead to an




t 1 < FV in this case.
Contrary to 2(a), the assumption that the marginal prots are increasing in the duty is illustrated
in Figure 2(b): the prots decrease less in the export price when the duties are higher. In this case, the
16Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Proposition 5.
17This is the assumption that Blonigen and Park (2004) make throughout their paper. It can be shown that this
assumption is not necessary for the predictions they test empirically.
12non-integrated foreign producer increases its export price when the duty level increases, and decreases
its export price when duty level decreases.











To analyze the optimal behavior of non-integrated foreign producers, suppose the foreign producer
dumps initially (in period 0), and that antidumping duties are imposed in period 1. Once the an-
tidumping duties are imposed, the foreign producer would like to increase its price, which is too low
relative to its steady-state post-duty price.
If the optimal export price is decreasing in the duty, an increase in the current export price will
entail a further increase in next period's export price, and so on, resulting in a monotonic decrease in
the duties over time. This is the case analyzed in Blonigen and Park (2004). Since the ratio of current
to past export price is greater than one, the U.S. consumer price will be higher than the fair-value
price, starting from period 1. Once the steady-state is reached, p
t = p
t 1 and pt = FV .
Alternatively, if the optimal export price is increasing in the duty, an increase in the current export
price will entail a decrease in next period's export price, and so on. Whenever the current export price
is higher than the previous export price, resulting in a ratio higher than one, then the U.S. consumer
price will be higher than the fair-value price. When the current export price is lower than the previous
export price and the ratio is thus smaller than 1, then the U.S. consumer price will be lower than
the fair-value price. As a result, antidumping duties, export prices, and U.S. consumer prices will all
oscillate over time in this case. Once the steady-state is reached, p
t = p
t 1 and pt = FV .
Proposition 3.3 formally characterizes the dynamic pricing behavior of non-integrated rms. Its
rst part is identical to the analysis of Blonigen and Park (2004) and is repeated here for completeness.
Its second part, though, considers an alternative assumption on demand curvature:
Proposition 3.3 Assume there exists a unique stationary equilibrium with antidumping duties for the
non-integrated foreign producer, with the associated stationary foreign export price denoted by p
;s
N . If
D() satises (A1)-(A2), then once antidumping duties are imposed:
1. If @2
@p
t@t < 0, and assuming that p
;s
N > ^ p
N (where ^ p
N is the static optimal export price in the
absence of antidumping policy, that is ^ p
N = argmaxp(p   c)D(p)), the non-integrated foreign
producer will set its prices so that the duty decreases over time (through the review process) until
reaching the steady state p
;s




3::: and 0  1  2  3::: where
13period 1 indicates the rst time an antidumping duty is imposed.18
2. if @2
@p
t@t > 0, either the non-integrated foreign producer will cease dumping immediately after
the duties are imposed, or else prices and duties will oscillate, and then converge to steady-state













3::: and 1  2, 2  3, 3  4, and so on, until steady-state dumping
p
;s
N < FV is reached.
Proof See Appendix A
If marginal prots are decreasing in the duty (part 1), then the optimal price is decreasing in
the duty and prices will increase monotonically to steady-state. As a result, the duties will decrease
monotonically over time. This convergence path is shown in Figure 3(a).
Alternatively, if marginal prots are increasing in the duty (part 2), then the optimal export price is
increasing in the duty, leading to oscillation of prices around steady-state, as shown in Figure 3(b), point
A, which illustrates the case of steady-state dumping. However, if there is no dumping at steady-state
(p
s = FV ), as illustrated by Figure 3(b), point B, then the optimal response of the foreign producer is
to set p
1 > FV (> p
0). But for export prices at or above the fair-value price, the next period's duties
are zero, so the continuation value is identical. As a result, the next period's optimal price response is
the same for all prices at or above the fair-value price. When the fair-value price is the steady-state
price, then it is equal to the non-integrated foreign producer's optimal response for prices at or above
the fair-value. Consequently, dumping ceases immediately in this case.
The dynamic model contrasts with the static model since, although the steady-state U.S. consumer
price still always equals the fair-value price in the dynamic model, the steady-state export price can be
lower than fair-value for the non-integrated producer.19 Since the consumer price in this case is xed
at fair-value, setting an export price below it simply means the foreign producer is transferring part
of its (potential) revenues to the U.S. government as duty payment. The dynamic path can give rise
to a steady-state such as this when the discount factor of the non-integrated foreign producer is low
enough. Once the steady-state is reached, the low discount factor insures that the foreign producer will
be unwilling to give up its current prots in order to shift to higher future prots at p
s = FV .
18As noted in Blonigen and Park (2004), the condition p
;s
N > ^ p
N guarantees that initially, the rm dumps no less than
its steady state dumping level, so that once duties are imposed, they (weakly) decrease to the steady state level.
19Throughout the paper, I assume that the stationary equilibrium is unique. However, the existence of an equilibrium
with p

s < FV raises the possibility of multiple stationary equilibria, some of which are inecient. As noted in Blonigen
and Park (2001), this can create an unstable equilibrium in which a shock would start movement to a new equilibrium.
Yet, in this paper (similar to Blonigen and Park (2004)), I focus on the unique stationary equilibrium case. Note also that
when the optimal policy function is decreasing there can be no more than one stationary equilibrium so the steady-state
is always unique.
14Note that when the demand at the fair-value price is more elastic, it responds more to price changes
there. In particular, the non-integrated foreign producer has to change its export price by less to
achieve the desired impact on the domestic demand. As a result, the U.S. consumer price also responds
less to duty changes around the steady-state fair-value price. If the current export price responds less
to duty changes, then necessarily the current export price responds less to past export price changes.
When the optimal policy function is increasing, the result is a more positive (steeper) slope near the
steady-state. When the optimal policy function is decreasing, the result is a less negative (
atter) slope
around the steady-state. The following proposition characterizes the non-integrated foreign producer's
optimal policy function around the steady-state:
Proposition 3.4 The more elastic consumer demand is at the fair-value price, the less the U.S.
consumer price responds to duty changes around the steady-state when the foreign producer is non-
integrated. When demand is not too convex, the increasing optimal-policy-function is steeper around
the steady-state when demand is more elastic there. When demand is suciently convex, the decreasing
optimal-policy function is 
atter around the steady-state when demand is more elastic there.
Proof See Appendix A
3.3.3 The Dynamic Optimization Problem of The Integrated Foreign Producer
I now turn to examine the vertical structure not considered in Blonigen and Park (2004): the dynamic
optimization problem of a foreign producer vertically integrated with its domestic importer, in which a
single entity produces the product abroad, determines the U.S. consumer price, and pays all duty fees.
Given a discount factor  2 [0;1], the non-integrated foreign producer's optimization problem, once








t(pt[1   (pt 1)]   c)D(pt); (12)
where FV and p0 are taken as given.
To characterize how the optimal U.S. consumer price responds to antidumping-duty changes, I take
the derivative of marginal prots with respect to (pt 1). The sign of this derivative equals the sign of
the derivative of optimal consumer price by duty:20
@2V I
@pt@t
=  ptD0   D(pt) = (p(pt)   1)D(pt) > 0 (13)
20Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Proposition 5.
15where p(pt) (i.e., demand elasticity at pt) is always greater than 1 when the seller is a monopoly.
Regardless of demand curvature, marginal prots are always increasing in the duty for the integrated
foreign producer, so optimal U.S. consumer price is increasing in the duty.
Qualitatively, the impact of higher duties on the integrated foreign producer's prot function is
similar to that depicted in Figure 2(b) for the non-integrated case. The mechanism is very dierent,
however. For the integrated foreign producer, the duty is a direct cost. Because it is optimal to raise
prices in response to a cost increase, the integrated producer's prots decrease less in consumer price
when duties are higher.
Suppose the integrated foreign producer dumps initially (in period 0). When antidumping duties
are rst imposed in period 1, the integrated foreign producer faces higher costs, so its optimal response
is to set a higher U.S. consumer price. In the following period, it faces a lower duty and thus sets
a lower price, and so on. Because the integrated foreign producer internalizes the duty as a cost, its
antidumping duties will oscillate, regardless of demand conditions.
Let pI
s indicate the integrated foreign producer's steady-state U.S. consumer price. The proposition
below parallels Proposition 3.3 and formally characterizes the optimal price path for the integrated
foreign producer once duties are imposed:
Proposition 3.5 Assume there exists a unique stationary equilibrium with antidumping duties for
the integrated foreign producer, with the associated stationary U.S. consumer price denoted by ps
I, for
the integrated foreign producer. When D() satises (A1)-(A2), then, once the duties are imposed,
either dumping ceases immediately, or prices and duties oscillate and converge to steady-state dumping
(ps
I < FV ). In the former case, p0  p1;p1  p2 = ps
I = FV and 1  2 = s
I = 0. In the latter
case, p0  p1, p1  p2;p2  p3::: and 1  2, 2  3, 3  4, and so on until steady-state dumping is
reached (ps
I < FV ).
Proof See Appendix A
According to Proposition 3.5, the integrated foreign producer's optimal policy function is decreasing
in the price, so prices oscillate towards steady-state. As in the static model, steady-state consumer price
can be lower than \fair-value," if demand is suciently elastic at the \fair-value" price (the proof is
similar to that of proposition 3.2 and not repeated here). The duty convergence path for the integrated
foreign producer is qualitatively similar to the path shown in Figure 3(b) for the non-integrated case.
Point A in Figure 3(b) corresponds to a steady-state with positive dumping. Point B depicts the
case of a steady-state without dumping: for prices at or above the fair-value price the optimal U.S.
16consumer price response is identical and equals the fair-value price when it is the steady-state, leading
to immediate cessation of dumping in this case.
The model implies that oscillation of prices and duties can be observed for both non-integrated and
integrated foreign producers (Proposition 3.3, part 2, and Proposition 3.5). The theory points out,
however, that the reasons for the oscillation are dierent for non-integrated and for integrated foreign
producers. In the integrated case, the oscillation occurs because the foreign producer internalizes
the duty as a cost. It is independent of any specic characteristics of domestic consumer demand.
In the non-integrated case, oscillation arises only if the curvature of the demand is such that the
foreign producer's optimal export price is increasing in the duty. There is no reason to believe that the
oscillation patterns of integrated and non-integrated foreign producers should be quantitatively similar.
Note that a higher elasticity of demand lowers the integrated rm's markup, causing its U.S. con-
sumer price to react more to shifts in cost, and thus to changes in duty. Proposition 3.6 parallels
Proposition 3.4, characterizing the optimal policy function around the steady-state for the integrated
foreign producer:
Proposition 3.6 The more elastic consumer demand at steady-state, the more the U.S. consumer price
responds to duty changes, and the steeper is the integrated producer's optimal policy function around
the steady-state.
Proof See Appendix A
Comparing Proposition 3.6 and Proposition 3.4, it is clear that a higher demand elasticity at steady-
state consumer price has opposite eects on the prices of integrated and non-integrated foreign produc-
ers.
3.3.4 Exit from The U.S. market After Imposition of Antidumping Duties
Thus far, I have assumed that the foreign producer continues importing to the U.S. market after the
duties are imposed. Yet the foreign producer may exit the U.S. market altogether after the introduction
of antidumping duties. Here I complete my analysis by examining the decision to exit the U.S. market,
with an emphasis on the dierences between integrated and non-integrated foreign producers.
One might expect integrated foreign producers to have sunk investments in the United States,
making them less likely to exit in the presence of a negative cost shock. In the trade literature, it is
customary to assume that the sunk-costs of non-integrated foreign producers are lower than those of
integrated foreign producers.21 According to this assumption, integrated foreign producers are more
21For example, this is the case in Antr as and Helpman (2004) for vertical integration and in Helpman, Melitz, and
Yeaple (2004) for horizontal integration.
17productive and are thus less likely to exit in the presence of a negative shock, since their continuation
value is higher. In addition, integrated foreign producers that wish to exit the U.S. market are likely
to incur higher exit costs (i.e. additional costs related to nding alternative import sources for their
domestic importer, selling it, or closing it down).
However, in the case of antidumping duties, there is an additional motivation for higher U.S. exit
rates of non-integrated foreign producers after the imposition of antidumping duties. Recall that for
a non-integrated foreign producer, the duty is based on the dierence between its fair-value price and
its U.S. export price in the prior period. For an integrated foreign producer, the duty is based on
the dierence between the foreign producer's fair-value price and its U.S. consumer price in the prior
period. Intuitively, the dierent calculations imply that if an integrated and a non-integrated foreign
producer that face the same duty today set their prices so that the current U.S. consumer price is
identical in both cases, then in the following period the duty on the integrated foreign producer will be
lower. As a result, an antidumping duty has a bigger impact on the protability of a non-integrated
foreign producer, all else being equal. Thus, a non-integrated producer is more likely to exit the U.S.
market after the duties are imposed.
The dierences in the calculation of the duty margin for integrated and non-integrated foreign
producers also imply that at the steady-state, the integrated producer maintains full control over its
U.S. consumer price, whereas for the non-integrated producer, the U.S. consumer price is equal to
the fair-value price, regardless of its export price. Consequently, integrated foreign producers can
respond more eciently to the duties and hence have higher prots at the steady-state. The following
proposition characterizes the steady-state prots of integrated and non-integrated foreign producers,
following the imposition of antidumping duties:
Proposition 3.7 At steady-state, all else being equal, the operating prots of integrated foreign pro-
ducers are no lower than those of non-integrated foreign producers.
Proof See Appendix A
Once antidumping duties are imposed, any foreign producer that has a negative continuation value
from then on will subsequently exit the U.S. market. Since steady-state operating prots of the non-
integrated producer are lower, according to proposition 3.7, it is more likely than the integrated producer
to leave the U.S. market once antidumping duties are introduced. This claim is formalized in the fol-
lowing corollary:
Corollary of Proposition 3.7 If there are xed costs of exporting in every period, then non-integrated
foreign producers are more likely than integrated ones to leave the U.S. market once antidumping duties
have been imposed.
18Proof See Appendix A
Integrated foreign producers are more ecient than non-integrated ones after antidumping duties
are imposed, because they control their U.S. consumer price directly. Since the duties are paid by the
domestic importer, they create a wedge between the non-integrated producer's export price and the U.S.
consumer price. In my model, this wedge exists only for non-integrated producers after the imposition
of antidumping duties: there is no wedge between the foreign export price and the U.S. consumer price
in the absence of antidumping policy. The policy's dierent treatment of foreign producers according
to their vertical structure leads to dierent exit rates from the U.S. market once duties are imposed.
4 Data
The data for this paper include all antidumping investigations against foreign producers that were
initiated in the United States between 1980 and 1995. The dataset constructed here is based on the
dataset of Blonigen and Park (2004), which includes initial antidumping duty levels as well as the
rst administrative review's duty levels (when applicable). I supplement their data with all initial
or subsequent administrative reviews of these orders that occurred until May 2008.22 The data were
collected from Federal Register notices, through the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe legal research
database. Appendix C includes the names and descriptions of the variables in the data and indicates
whether they were part of the original dataset or an addition.
There were 1182 foreign producers that were subject to an antidumping investigation in the data.
The total number of investigations initiated during this period was 489. Of these investigations, 157
ended in a negative determination, 55 were terminated (either an agreement with the U.S. government
or domestic petition withdrawal) and 277 ended in an antidumping duty order. A quarter of these
orders (71 cases) were still in eect as of May 2008.
The percentage of integrated rms within each antidumping investigation outcome (positive, i.e.
antidumping duties; negative; terminated) is shown in Table 1. About 30% of the rms in the data
are integrated, and the proportion is similar for negative, terminated and positive (i.e. antidumping
duties) investigation outcomes. Clearly, the share of integrated rms in antidumping orders is by no
means negligible.
22Between 1995 and 2008 there were a couple of changes to U.S. antidumping policy. First, as noted in Section 2.2,
since 1998 non-integrated foreign producers can choose to pay the duties instead of the domestic importers. However, in
the dataset I found very few cases where the non-integrated foreign producer did so.
The second relevant change to antidumping policy is that since 1995, importer's prot margins are deducted from the U.S.
consumer price of the integrated foreign producer. Note rst that in the theoretical model above, this regulation has no
impact since importer margins are zero to begin with. Furthermore, Lindsey and Ikenson (2002) check the actual impact
of the importer-prot deduction on duty margins and nd that it is relatively minor (an average of 1:2%) in their data
(p.21).
194.1 General Characteristics of Antidumping Duties
In order to examine the composition of the products in my dataset, I classied them into four mutually
exclusive categories:
 Steel - all steel and carbon-steel sheets, plates, nails, pipes etc., excluding steel consumer products
(e.g. stainless steel cookware).
 Chemicals, minerals and metals - all chemical compounds, minerals (such as cement) and metals,
excluding intermediates made from such products (e.g. acrylic yarn or iron castings).
 Finished products - all products which are not inputs into further production, including food
products (e.g. microwaves, bicycles, pencils, towels, canned or frozen foods)
 Other intermediates - all products which do not t another category (e.g. acrylic yarn, iron
castings, DRAMs).
There is a relatively high proportion of steel products (about one-third) in the overall universe of an-
tidumping investigations and orders. One fth of the rms in the steel cases are integrated. Chemicals,
minerals and metals are about 13% of all antidumping cases in the data, and the share of integrated
rms in the chemicals' cases is about 30%. Finished products are 27% of the cases, and integrated
rms are about 38% of these cases. All other intermediates are the remaining 20% of the cases, and
44% of the remaining cases involve integrated rms.
The rst column of Table 2 includes summary statistics for the main variables in the data. The
second and third columns display the statistics separately for non-integrated and integrated foreign
producers. The fourth includes the results of a t-test for the equality of integrated and non-integrated
means. The rst four rows of the Table display data on antidumping duty levels and duty changes.
Note that the duties tend to be very high: an average of 23% of value for all duties, 33% for initial
duties. The dierence between integrated and non-integrated average duty levels is insignicant ini-
tially. However, overall average duty levels are signicantly dierent for integrated and non-integrated
foreign producers, implying that the response to the duties may vary by vertical structure. The average
level of the duties when zero-review orders are excluded is slightly lower. The average initial change
in the duties is considerably negative, but still leaves the next period's duty level at about 20% on
average. Initial duty changes are signicantly larger for integrated foreign producers relative to their
non-integrated counterparts, again indicating dierences in the response to the duties by vertical struc-
ture. The dierence between average duty changes of integrated and non-integrated foreign producers
is insignicant, probably because of high variation in duty changes.
Figure 4 further highlights the dierences in actual antidumping duty patterns for integrated and
non-integrated foreign producers. The gure displays the distribution of antidumping duty changes
over time (by administrative review) for non-integrated and integrated foreign producers separately.
Clearly, there are distinct patterns of convergence for each type of rm. The changes in the duties
20are more dispersed initially for non-integrated foreign producers but converge faster. By contrast, the
changes in the duties of integrated foreign producers are less dispersed initially but take longer to
converge.
The sixth and seventh rows of Table 2 provide information on the use of \best information available"
in the calculation of antidumping duties. Recall that best information available is used by Commerce
when information provided by the foreign rm is deemed inadequate. It is often based on data provided
by the domestic industry and tends to result in higher duty levels. According to the table, best
information available was used in almost one quarter of non-integrated duty calculations (both initial
orders and administrative reviews). The proportion for integrated foreign producers is lower, but
still close to one-fth. The proportion of integrated foreign producers that ever had best information
available used in a duty calculation is over one half, higher than the corresponding proportion of non-
integrated rms (45%). Note that the use of best information available aects both antidumping duty
levels and antidumping duty changes over time. For this reason, I control for the use of best information
available by Commerce in my empirical analysis.
The eighth row of the Table displays data on the length of antidumping duties in years: the orders
last about 12 years on average, both for integrated and non-integrated foreign producers.
4.2 Characteristics of Administrative Review Requests
As mentioned in Section 2, antidumping duties can be updated through subsequent administrative
reviews. The review of the order must be initiated either by domestic producers or by the foreign
producer that is subject to the duties.
The last two rows of Table 2 show the proportion of domestic and foreign rms that requested an
administrative review. Unfortunately, 24% of the reviews in my dataset (494 individual rm reviews)
do not have data on the identity of the petitioners for the review. For the most part, the reviews that
lack petitioner information are extremely complicated and involve many foreign producers.
The model presented above assumes that rms are sophisticated in that they are forward looking
and understand the impact of current prices on future duties. If this is indeed the case, foreign produc-
ers should ask for an administrative review when they expect the duties to decrease, while domestic
producers should ask for a review when they expect the duties to increase. Figure 5 displays box-plots
of changes in antidumping duties over time (excluding outside values, for clarity) by the party that
asked for the review, i.e. domestic, foreign producer or both. Indeed, the changes in the duties tend
to be positive (an increase in the duty) following a domestic petition and negative (a decrease in the
duty) following a foreign petition, at least for the rst 10 reviews. When both parties ask for a review,
there is no clear tendency, at least for the second through ninth reviews. Interestingly, it seems the
duties tend to decrease when both parties ask for the rst review.
The theory predicts that antidumping duties should oscillate over time for integrated foreign produc-
21ers (Proposition 3.5) and either oscillate or decrease monotonically for non-integrated foreign producers
(Proposition 3.3). To the extent that rms are forward looking, oscillation implies that review requests
should alternate between the domestic industry (after a period of low prices) and the foreign producers
(after a period of high prices). Alternatively, if prices increase monotonically to the steady-state, for-
eign producers should always request for reviews of the order while the domestic industry should never
do so. The proportions of requests for review in Table 2's last two rows seem to support an oscillating
pattern, since they are quite similar for foreign and domestic rms and less than one.
The ndings support the assertion that rms are forward looking and understand the implications
of antidumping policy for optimal pricing behavior. This validates the ability of the theoretical model
to capture and rationalize the actual behavior of rms faced with antidumping duties.
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section I examine the model's three main testable predictions: (1) that non-integrated produc-
ers are more likely than integrated ones to exit the U.S. market once antidumping duties are imposed,
(2) that, once antidumping duties are imposed, integrated foreign producers' either cease dumping
immediately or their duties oscillate and converge to steady-state dumping, while the response of non-
integrated foreign producers depends on the shape of the demand curve, and (3) that the varying
demand-elasticities of dierent commodity groups aects the slopes of producers' optimal-policy func-
tions . In each of the following three subsections, I rst present my empirical ndings, and then relate
them to the corresponding prediction.
5.1 Exit from The U.S. Market After Antidumping Duties are Imposed
Figure 6 presents the distribution of antidumping orders by the total number of administrative reviews,
for integrated and non-integrated foreign producers. Since I have no data on actual shipments by
foreign producers, I use orders (both revoked and ongoing) without any administrative reviews as a
proxy for foreign producer's exit from the U.S. market when antidumping duties are imposed. For
revoked orders, it is plausible that zero reviews indicate that the foreign producer left the U.S. market,
leading to a subsequent revocation of the order. For ongoing orders, the lack of duty revisions could
potentially be the result of continuous dumping rather than U.S. exit, if the foreign producer simply
keeps its price unchanged. Yet an antidumping order can be kept in place even if the foreign producer
no longer exports to the United States. Indeed, most unreviewed ongoing orders in my data are of this
\inactive ongoing" type: I examined several Federal Register records for ongoing orders without any
reviews and found that imports by the aected companies fell by 97% or more, following the imposition
of the duties. Such a drastic decrease in imports most likely indiacates exit from the U.S. market.
According to Figure 6, the dierence in exit patterns between integrated and non-integrated foreign
22producers is drastic: while 46% of non-integrated foreign producers left the U.S. market immediately
after duties were imposed, only 26% of integrated foreign producers did the same. This dierence is
highly signicant according to a t-test for equality of means.
These ndings are consistent with the corollary of Proposition 3.7, which states that integrated
foreign producers should be less likely to exit the U.S. market after antidumping duties are imposed.
5.2 Price Path by Integration Status
Table 3 presents the distribution of initial rm-specic duty changes in the data (i.e., the dierence
between the rm's initial duty level and its level after the rst review). The rst column includes all
antidumping cases with one or more reviews, while the second column excludes cases where use of best
information available could have aected the direction of the duty change. Since it is often based on
data provided by domestic producers, best information available tends to result in high duties, and no
longer re
ects the foreign rm's pricing strategy. In the second column of the table, I exclude positive
duty changes where best information available was used in the rst review, and negative changes where
it was used in the initial order.
The rst column of the table indicates that duties decreased initially for 61% of antidumping
cases. They remained unchanged for 18% of cases and increased for the remaining 21%.23 Once best-
information-available cases are excluded, the number of orders where duties decreased in the rst review
increases to 75%, with 14% remaining unchanged and 11% increasing initially.
The theoretical model predicts that initial duty change will be nonpositive when the enforcement of
the duties is uncertain: if a rm assigns a low enough probability to being caught, it will initially dump
more than its steady-state dumping level. Otherwise, it will set its pre-duty price equal to its steady-
state dumping level. The majority of antidumping cases in the data conform with this prediction.
However, 11% of the cases had their initial duty levels subsequently increased, even after I exclude
cases where best information available could have aected the direction of the duty change.
Table 4 presents the distribution of rm-specic antidumping duties over time, by vertical integra-
tion. The rst two rows include the percentages of rm-specic cases that had their antidumping duties
increased or decreased twice or more in a row. The next two rows display the proportions of rms with
monotonically decreasing or increasing duties throughout the data period. The last two rows display
the same proportion, after excluding cases where use of best information available could have aected
the direction of the duty change. In particular, I exclude cases where the current duty was increased
after use of best information available in the current review, as well as those where the current duty
decreased after its use in the previous review. About one quarter of all rms had their duties increased
or decreased twice or more in a row, but less than 3% of all foreign producers had monotonically de-
creasing duties throughout the data period. After I control for the use of best information available,
23These proportions are similar to the original Blonigen and Park (2004) database.
23no rm had monotonically increasing duties. While the duty oscillation in the data is not perfect, the
table suggests that monotonic convergence is extremely rare.
The model predicts that the prices and duties of integrated rms should either oscillate and converge
to steady-state dumping, or drop to zero immediately after the duties are imposed (Proposition 3.5).
The convergence path of antidumping duties in the non-integrated case depends on the curvature of
the demand function (Proposition 3.3): if demand is not too convex, non-integrated rms' duties and
prices will converge monotonically to steady-state. Otherwise, non-integrated duties will oscillate and
converge to steady-state dumping, or duties will drop to zero immediately. Table 4 suggests that
oscillation (or at least non-monotonic duty-change) is the rule for all foreign producers. The fact that
there are no cases of monotonically increasing antidumping duties (once best-information-available
cases are excluded) can be taken as an additional support for the theory.
Figure 7 depicts the relation between current and past duty changes using simple scatter plots.
The left panel of the gure plots current duty change on past duty change for non-integrated foreign
producers while the right panel does the same for integrated foreign producers. Cases with duties
higher than 100% (about 1% of the data) were excluded, for clarity . The gure also includes the
corresponding regression lines. The plots suggest the existence of a negative relation between current
and past duty changes, for both non-integrated and integrated foreign producers.
To further examine the patterns of duty changes over time, Table 5 presents estimates from the
following regression equation of past duty-change on current duty-change:
Duty changei;t = b0 + b1Duty changei;t 1 + b2BIAi;t + b3BIAi;t 1 + b4Xi + ei;t (14)
where Duty Changei;t is the change in the duty for rm i between period t and period t 1; BIAi;t equals
1 whenever best information available was used in period t's review; and Xi are other time-invariant
variables, which vary by specication. The Table includes four specications, repeated separately for
integrated and non-integrated foreign producers. The rst has no xed-eects. The second includes
rm xed eects, which are signicant for non-integrated foreign producers. As noted by Nickell (1981),
the inclusion of rm-level eects in dynamic models causes a downward-bias in the estimated coecient
on the lagged variable (i.e. the coecient on past duty change), which is most severe for short panels.
Hence, the third specication replaces the rm-level xed eects with sector-level xed eects (3-digit
TSUSA codes), since increasing the number of observations within each group reduces the severity of
the Nickell-bias. The last specication utilizes GLS estimation to account for heteroskedasticity and
rm-specic autocorrelation. In all four specications, the coecient on past duty change is negative,
signicant, and less than one for both integrated and non-integrated foreign producers.24 As expected,
the coecient on the use of best information available in the current review is positive and signicant in
all four specications. The coecient on the use of best information available in the previous review is
24I have also examined a specication where the Nickell-bias in the specications with rm xed-eects was corrected,
and the standard errors were boot-strapped (Bruno (2005)'s estimator for unbalanced panels). The coecient on past
duty change was still negative, signicant and less than one for both integrated and non-integrated foreign producers.
24negative and mostly signicant. Since the use of best information available tends to result in articially
high duties, the negative coecient on BIAi;t 1 is not surprising. In addition, the intercept of the
regression is insignicant in most of the specications and relatively small. When I run the same
specications pooled over all foreign producers, I reject the hypothesis that the coecient on past duty
change is the same for integrated and non-integrated foreign producers in the last specication.25
The oscillation scenario is born out by the coecient on past duty change in Table 5, which is
signicant, negative and less than one. Since oscillation means duty changes are alternately positive
and negative and convergence means the magnitude of the oscillation decreases over time, the two
together imply that the coecient on past duty change in the regression should be between zero and
negative one when duties are oscillating. By contrast, monotonic convergence implies that the coecient
on past duty change in the regression should be positive.
Table 6 repeats the specications of Table 5, using normalized duty changes. Although consecutive
reviews of an antidumping order should occur annually, some reviews take longer in practice than
others, leading to longer gaps between consecutive duty updates. Furthermore, if no party asks for
an administrative review of the order in a certain year, the gap between two consecutive reviews
can be even larger. To account for these dierences, I divide each duty change by the length of the
interval (in years) between the reviews. Qualitatively, the results of the normalized regressions are
very similar to those of Table 5. The coecient on past duty change is between zero and negative
one, and signicant in most specications.26 The coecient on the use of best information available
is positive and signicant for the current review and negative or not signicantly dierent than zero
for the previous review. The intercept is relatively small and insignicant in most of the specications.
When I run the same specications pooled over all foreign producers, I cannot reject the assumption
that the coecient on past duty change is the same for integrated and non-integrated foreign producers
in the last specication.
Finally, Table 7 repeats the xed-eect specications of Table 5 with the addition of sector time-
trends (3-digit TSUSA code multiplied by the year of the administrative review) to try and capture
industry-wide trends which might have aected rm-specic responses. The coecient on past duty
change is still negative, signicant and less than one in absolute value for both integrated and non-
integrated foreign producers (and in the pooled regression as well).27
Overall, the empirical ndings in Tables 5, 6 and 7 support the theoretical prediction that duties
25I also repeated these specications using sign dummies that equal 1 when the duty change is positive and -1 when it
is negative. The coecients were qualitatively similar: signicantly negative and less than one for both integrated and
non-integrated foreign producers.
26I have also examined a specication where the Nickell-bias of the coecient on past duty change in the specications
with rm xed eects was corrected and the standard errors were boot-strapped (the Bruno (2005) estimator for unbalanced
panels). The coecient on past duty change was negative and less than one in the non-integrated case but positive and
insignicant in the integrated case.
27In addition to these specications, I also tried excluding all reviews that happened more than 5 years after the initial
order was imposed. The presumption here is that unobservable industry or market conditions would remain fairly stable
during a relatively shorter period of time. Again, the coecient on past duty change is negative, (mostly) signicant and
less then one for both the pooled and the separate regressions in this case.
25should oscillate and converge over time for integrated foreign producers. For non-integrated foreign
producers, the negative coecient on past duty change (i.e. oscillation) can be accommodated by the
theory, if demand is suciently convex. However, non-integrated oscillation alone cannot conrm or
refute the theoretical model.
Both Proposition 3.5 and Proposition 3.3 with convex demand imply that post antidumping duty
behavior should dier depending on steady-state prices. Specically, foreign rms that would not dump
in steady-state should cease dumping immediately after duties are imposed. This additional prediction
can be used to test the validity of the theory for both the integrated and non-integrated case.
Unfortunately, detecting immediate cessation of dumping in the data is dicult. Revoked orders
might seem like a good proxy, but revocation can also be caused by lack of interest by the domestic
industry, or by Sunset reviews. As mentioned in Section 2, only after three consecutive reviews with
zero duties can an antidumping order be revoked. This last feature of the policy helps dierentiate
between U.S.-market exit (no administrative reviews) and cessation of dumping (three consecutive
reviews without dumping).
In order to examine whether foreign producers that ceased dumping did so immediately, I compare
rms whose orders were revoked after a zero-duty review to the group of all other rms. The rst
group represents rms whose orders were revoked presumably because they ceased dumping: those
whose orders were revoked for other reasons did not attempt to cease dumping, nor did those whose
orders were not revoked at all. Thus, I dene \cessation intent" cases as all revoked antidumping
orders whose last duty level (prior to revocation) was de-minimis.28 Fewer than 8% of ongoing orders
had zero duties in their latest review, compared to 30% of revoked orders (excluding orders without
any reviews, i.e. immediate U.S.-market exit cases). For the cessation-intent group, the average total
number of reviews with de-minimis duties was 2.7. For all other orders, the average total number of
reviews with de-minimis duties was 0.4. Thus, as the theory predicts, rms whose last duty prior to
revocation was de-minimis seem to be consistently trying to reduce their duty level, while this is not
the case for orders where the nal (or latest) duty level was higher than de-minimis.
Figure 8 displays the distribution of non-integrated rms' antidumping duties over time, for both
cessation-intent cases and the group of all other cases. Figure 9 does the same for integrated rms'
antidumping duties. After the initial antidumping order, duty levels fell drastically, and remained
relatively close to zero, in the cessation-intent group. No such pattern is found in the group of all other
orders. This distinction holds for both types of foreign producers, further supporting the assertion
that foreign producers who ceased dumping did so immediately after the duties were imposed. This
empirical result is consistent with the theory for integrated foreign producers, and for non-integrated
foreign producers with suciently convex demand.
28If the dumping margins found by Commerce are 0:5% or less (de-minimis), the eective duty is zero.
265.3 Price Paths and Consumer Import-Demand Elasticities
In this section I examine whether and how the slope of the optimal-policy function changes with the
elasticity of U.S. consumer demand for the imported good.
As mentioned in section 4, the products in my data can be classied into four groups: steel;
chemicals, minerals and metals; nished products; and all other intermediates. Table 8 presents the
estimates from the following regression equation:
Duty changei;t = b0 + b1Duty changei;t 1 + b2Duty changei;t 1  Steel + b3Duty changei;t 1  Chem
+ b4Duty changei;t 1  Finished + b5BIAi;t + b6BIAi;t 1 + b7Xi + ei;t (15)
where Duty Changei;t is the change in the duty for rm i between period t and period t   1;
Duty Changei;t  Commodity group is the interaction of past duty change with a dummy that equals 1
when the products belongs to the corresponding commodity group (steel, chemicals or nished prod-
ucts); BIAi;t equals 1 whenever best information available was used in period t's review; and Xi are
other time-invariant variables, which vary by specication. The table includes four specications for
integrated and non-integrated foreign producers. The rst specication has commodity xed eects
(with robust standard errors) and the second has rm xed eects (with robust standard errors). The
third specication replaces the rm-level xed eects with sector-level xed eects (3-digit TSUSA
codes), since increasing the number of observations within each group of the panel reduces the severity
of the Nickell-bias. The last specication utilizes GLS estimation to account for heteroskedasticity and
rm-specic autocorrelation. The specications include all orders with two or more reviews. Since
the average number of administrative reviews in the data (excluding zero review orders) is 3.9 and the
median is 3, it is plausible that orders with two or more reviews should include many duties that are
at or near their steady-state level.
In all four specications, the coecient on past duty level is negative, and, except for the rst two
specications for non-integrated rms, signicant. The coecient on past duty change for integrated
foreign producers of steel is negative and signicant. Most interestingly, the coecient on nished
products is negative in all the non-integrated rms' specication (and signicant for the second and
third specications) and positive in all the integrated rms' specications (and signicant in all but
the second specication).
According to Proposition 3.4, when demand elasticity at or around the steady-state is higher and
demand is suciently convex, the slope of the non-integrated producer's optimal policy function should
be 
atter around the steady-state. According to Proposition 3.6, the opposite is true for integrated
foreign producers: the optimal policy function should be steeper around steady state the higher the
elasticity of demand. A steeper decreasing optimal policy function implies slower convergence over
time, while a 
atter (decreasing) optimal policy function implies faster convergence over time. This
means that for more elastic goods, the coecient on past duty change should be more negative for
an integrated producer and less negative for a non-integrated producer. To the extent that demand
27for nished products is less elastic than demand for other intermediates and demand for steel is more
elastic, Table 8 provides some support this prediction.
However, the classication of products into the above four categories is very broad and likely to
incorporate some products with high demand elasticities with others whose actual demand elasticities
are lower. To address this concern, in Table 9 I use a dierent method to examine the impact of demand
elasticities on the pass-through of duties around steady-state. Specically, I use Broda and Weinstein
(2006)'s estimates of (import) demand elasticities. Note that these estimates are drawn under the
assumption of CES utility, which is not suciently convex to satisfy condition (2) of my Proposition
3.3. However, here I use Broda and Weinstein (2006)'s elasticity estimates to build a binary variable
that equals 1 for products with \high" demand elasticity. I use Broda and Weinstein (2006)'s 7-digit
TSUSA (The Tari Schedule of the United States Annotated) elasticities for orders initiated before
1989 and Broda and Weinstein (2006)'s 10-digit HTS (Harmonized Tari Schedule) elasticities for later
orders.29 I then create a binary variable that is equal to 1 whenever demand elasticity is above the 66th
percentile of elasticities in Broda and Weinstein (2006)'s dataset, following their classication. The
table presents the estimates from the following regression equation:
Duty changei;t = b0 + b1Duty changei;t 1 + b2Duty changei;t 1  High elasticity + b3BIAi;t
+ b4BIAi;t 1 + b5Xi + ei;t (16)
where Duty Changei;t is the change in the duty for rm i between period t and period t   1;
Duty Changei;t  High elasticity is the interaction of past duty change with the high-elasticity dummy;
BIAi;t equals 1 whenever best information available was used in period t's review; and Xi are other
time-invariant variables, which vary by specication. The table includes four specications, which
are repeated separately for integrated and non-integrated foreign producers. The rst specication
includes the time-invariant high-elasticity dummy (with robust standard errors); the second has rm
xed-eects (with robust standard errors); the third replaces the rm-level xed eects with sector-level
xed eects (3-digit TSUSA codes), since increasing the number of observations within each group of
the panel reduces the severity of the Nickell-bias; and the last specication utilizes GLS estimation to
account for rm-specic autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The specications include all orders
with two or more reviews.
In all four specications, the coecient on past duty change is negative and signicant (except for
the rst column), for both non-integrated and integrated foreign producers. Most interestingly, the
coecient on the interaction between high import demand elasticity and past duty change is negative
for integrated foreign producers (and signicant in the GLS specication) but positive (and signicant
in the GLS specication) for non-integrated foreign producers.
According to Propositions 3.4 and 3.6 the coecient on past duty change should be more negative
29Whenever the investigation covers more than a single TSUSA (or HTS) category, I calculate the average elasticity
over all the categories that were included in the antidumping order. I use simple averages since I have no data on the
product's actual share of the relevant imports.
28in the integrated case and less negative in the non-integrated case when the elasticity of demand is
higher. To the extent that my measure of high import-demand elasticity is reliable, these ndings
provide additional support for the theoretical predictions.
6 Concluding Remarks
My model suggests, and my empirical analysis conrms, that trade policies can have very dierent
eects on dierent foreign producers exporting goods to the U.S. market, depending on these rms'
vertical structure: the current U.S. antidumping law creates very dierent incentives and behavior for
vertically-integrated rms than for foreign rms not integrated with their domestic importers. My
model accounts for these incentives, while my analysis of data on U.S. antidumping duties veries the
resulting behaviors. Both theoretical and empirical analyses show that optimal dynamic price paths,
pass-through of duties to nal market prices, and incentives for post-duty exit all dier, depending on
the vertical structure of the foreign producer and the domestic importer.
I nd that while the duties oscillate over time for both integrated and non-integrated foreign pro-
ducers, their oscillation patterns dier. Specically, the pass-through of the duties to U.S. consumer
price around steady-state diers for integrated and non-integrated foreign producers. I also nd that
foreign producers are much more likely than integrated ones to exit the U.S. market after antidumping
duties are imposed: since most rms from developing countries (LDCs) are not aliated with domestic
importers, this behavior points up a potential bias against LDCs that is built into U.S. antidumping
policy. And this, in turn, illustrates the importance of understanding how the incentives created by
trade policy depend on vertical integration: even in the absence of any deliberate discrimination, struc-
tural dierences between typical rms from dierent countries can be responsible for rms' diering
reactions to trade policy.
The dierent (and possibly unintended) outcomes of antidumping policy for rms with dierent
vertical structures point up the importance of studying how changes to the policy may aect integrated
and non-integrated rms' pricing behavior. For example, a 1998 policy change enabled a non-integrated
foreign producer to pay antidumping duties for its importer by declaring itself the \importer of record."
Under the assumption that the import sector is fully competitive, the optimization problem of a non-
integrated foreign producer that pays its own import duties is identical to the optimization problem of
an integrated foreign producer. This allows non-integrated producers to internalize the duties and thus
achieve the higher steady-state prots associated with vertical integration (see Proposition 3.7), making
them no more likely than integrated foreign producers to exit the U.S. market when new antidumping
duties are imposed.
But relaxing the fully-competitive import-section assumption cancels the above result: since both
the non-integrated producer and the independent importer can exercise market power, the domestic
importer sets its U.S. consumer price \too high." This means that if the non-integrated foreign producer
29internalizes the duties, it incurs additional costs but cannot lower consumer price as much as it would
like, so it will tend to avoid paying the duty even though it can, and the policy change will have no
impact in this case. Though a lack of data on duties initiated on or after 1998 puts testing these claims
beyond the scope of this paper, they highlight the importance of understanding the impacts of such
policies when rms are sophisticated.
Also important is comparative study of rms' behavior under EU and U.S. antidumping policies.
The policies dier: the EU does not enable absorption of the duty, whereas the U.S. allows integrated
foreign producers to absorb it fully. Specically, if the consumer price does not rise by the full amount
of the initial duty, EU authorities raise the duty until consumer prices there reach the desired level.
Future research might comparatively model both policies, to analyze how each policy dierentially
aects the behavior of integrated and non-integrated foreign producers under these two systems and
shed light on the possible welfare implications of each. Such research would not be merely interesting:
understanding the eects of rms' structures on their responses to trade policy is crucial to making it
more eective.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.2 Since the integrated foreign producer is a monopoly by assumption, its
prot maximization problem in the absence of antidumping policy is
max
p D(p)(p   c) (17)
Denote by ^ pI the solution to this problem. Then ^ pI solves the F.O.C., that is:
D0( ^ pI)( ^ pI   c) + D( ^ pI) = 0: (18)
The integrated optimization problem with antidumping policy is
max
p D(p)(p(1   (p)   c): (19)
Where, as we saw above, (p) = FV
p   1. Plugging the expression for (p) into (19) and rearranging,
we get:
max
p D(p)(2p   FV   c) (20)
Which yields the following F.O.C.:
D0(p)(2p   FV   c) + 2D(p) = 0: (21)
Plugging ^ pI into (21) and using (18), we get
D0( ^ pI)( ^ pI   FV ) + D( ^ pI) > 0: (22)
That is, the F.O.C. with antidumping duties is positive at ^ pI, implying that the optimal static price
with antidumping duties, pI is higher than the optimal static price in the absence of antidumping
policy.
For the optimal static price with antidumping duties to be lower than FV , (21) must be negative
at the fair-value price FV, that is
D0(FV )(FV   c) + 2D(FV ) < 0; (23)




FV   2] < cD0(FV )
 D(FV )[(FV )   2] < cD0(FV ) < 0; (24)
where (FV ) denotes demand elasticity at the fair-value price. Clearly, pI < FV only if (FV ) is high
enough.
32Proof of Proposition 3.3 The proof for the rst part of Proposition 3.3 can be found in Blonigen
and Park (2001). In order to prove the second part, I use the following Lemmas:











t   c)D([1 + (p
t 1)]p
t) (25)




f(p   c)D([1 + (p
t 1)]p
t) + V (p)g (26)
Then the non-integrated foreign producer's problems (25) and (26) have unique solutions which are
bounded, continuous and equivalent to each other. The optimal policy function,
G(p
 1) = fp 2 [0;1)jV (p
 1) = sup
p2[c;1)
f(p   c))D([1 + (p
t 1)]p
t) + V (p)g (27)
is a non-empty, compact-valued and upper-hemi continuous correspondence.
Proof Apply theorem 4.6 from Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989). Then, for the integrated rm:
1. WLOG, dene the set of prices the foreign rm can choose from P = [c;p], where
D(p) = 0 by assumption (A1). Since the rm will never choose a price lower than marginal cost,
we can conne out attention to prices above c.30 Thus, the impact of setting export prices higher
than p on future payos is identical to the impact of setting price equal to p. Then P is a closed
subset of R and hence convex.
2. 8p 2 P, the set of next period's feasible state variables (prices) if today's state is p is  (p) =
[c;p]  P, making it nonempty, compact-valued (closed and bounded subset of R) and continuous.
3. The per-period payo function, [p   c]D([1 + (p
t 1)]p
t) is continuous (multiplication of con-
tinuous functions) and bounded (multiplication of bounded function D and bounded sum, since
p  p < 1.
Lemma A.2 V (p) is a strictly increasing function in p 2 [c;p) . Denote the per-period prots of
the non-integrated foreign producer by (p;) = (p   c)q[(1 + )p]. If the foreign producer chooses
its initial price in the absence of antidumping duties, then if
@2(p;)
@p@ > 0, the non-integrated foreign
producer's optimal pricing path will have p
t 2 (c;p] 8t  0.
Proof We can apply Theorem 4.7 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989), as long as we show the
following hold (in addition to the conditions of Lemma 1):
1.
(p;) = (p   c)D([1 + (p
t 1)]p
t)
is strictly increasing in p
 1 2 [c;FV ). Indeed, taking the derivative of the per-period prot
function by p
 1 (recall that 1 + (p
 1) = FV
p
 1) we get: FV
(p
 1)2( D0)(p   c) > 0 8p 2 (c;FV ].
2.   is monotone in p since for p0  p,  (p0) = [c;p]   (p) = [c;p]
30Blonigen and Park (2001) have a detailed proof showing the rm will never choose a price below marginal costs.
Intuitively, not only static optimization precludes setting price at less than marginal costs, but also the lower the price,
the higher future duties, the lower future demand and so future prots cannot be higher.
33Next I narrow down the domain and image of G(p). If
@2(p;)
@p@ > 0, we can still show that p
0 > FV
is not optimal: (A2) implies that (p
0  c)D(p
0) < (FV  c)D(FV ). In addition, V (p
0) = V (FV ) since
the next period duty is zero in both cases. Thus, choosing FV strictly raises the payo hence p
0  FV .
We cannot show the same claim holds for p
1 since if the non-integrated foreign producer chooses
p
1 > FV , with 1 > 0 the F.O.C. at p
1 > FV is not necessarily negative. This is because the derivative
of prots w.r.t price is increasing in the duty in this case. Still, the non-integrated foreign producer
would never choose p > p, since demand is zero for all prices above this level by assumption (A1).
Lemma A.3 Let h(p) = maxG(p), l(p) = minG(p). If
@2(p;)
@p@ > 0, the optimal correspondence
for the non-integrated rm, G(p), is decreasing in p in the sense that h(p00) < l(p0) 8f(p0;p00)jp00 >
p0;p00;p0 2 (c;p]g. The optimal policy function is constant for p  FV .
Proof Assume
@2(p;)
@p@ > 0, where (p;) = (p   c)D([1 + ]p).




(l(p0)   c)D(l(p0)[1 + (p0)]) + V (l(p0)) 
(p   c)D([1 + (p0)]p) + V (l(p)), for all p 2 [c;FV ] (28)
Take p00 > p0. Then (p00) < (p0). Thus, 9  0 such that:
(l(p0)   c)D(l(p0)[1 + (p00)]) + V (l(p0)) =
(l(p0)   c)D(l(p0)[1 + (p0)]) + V (l(p0)) +  (29)
because @D
@ < 0 since price is increasing in costs, while demand is decreasing in price.
Claim:
(p   c)D([1 + (p0)]p) + V (p) +  >
(p   c)D([1 + (p00)]p) + V (p)), for all p 2 (l(p0);FV ] (30)
Proof: Dene A(p) = [(p  c)D([1+(p0)]p)]+V (p)+] [(p  c)D([1+(p00)]p)+V (p)] 
[(p;(p0))+V (p)+] [(p;(p00))+V (p)] Then by denition of , A(l(p0)) = 0. Our claim










@p > 0 (31)
since (p00) < (p0) and by our assumption above, marginal prots are increasing in .
Thus, combining equations (28), (30) and using the denition of , we get:
(l(p0)   c)D([1 + (p00)]p) + V (l(p0)) >
(p   c)D([1 + (p00)]p) + V (l(p)) + , for all p 2 (l(p0);FV ] (32)
Consequently, p = 2 G(p00) for all p 2 (l(p0);FV ], implying h(p00)  l(p0) 8p00 > p0.
Let p0 > FV . Then 8p00 2 (p0;p], (p0) = (p00) = 0. Thus, G(p0) = fpg 2 argmax[(p  
c)D([1 + (p0)]p) + V (p)] =
fpg 2 argmax[(p   c)D([1 + (p00)]p) + V (p)] = G(p00). In other words, the optimal policy
function is constant for export prices above the fair-value price in this case.
34Since initial enforcement of antidumping duties is uncertain, rms that assign low enough proba-






N and there is no price dynamics). If an















3;::: is determined by the optimal policy function G(p) characterized in Lemma 3, since an-
tidumping duties are enforced with certainty and by Lemma 1 the non-integrated optimization problem









1  FV (since for p  FV , G(p) = G(FV ) by lemma 3) and p
2 = FV .
Consequently, tau0 > 1 = 2 = 0.
2. Otherwise, p
;s
N < FV and p
0 < p
;s
N . Decreasing G implies export price will rst increase, then
decrease and keep oscillating between high and low levels until it reaches the unique steady-











2 and 0  1, 1  2. Consequently,








1 and so on, the importer
entails higher costs and sets higher consumer prices when p is higher (and vice versa).
Proof of Proposition 3.4 To characterize the relation between the elasticity of market demand at
steady-state consumer price and the optimal policy function, check how the slope of the optimal policy
function changes with demand elasticity p at steady-state consumer price, i.e. the fair-value price.
The non-integrated foreign producer's per-period prots when duty level is  = FV
p
t 1   1 are:
(p






t   c] (33)
The sign of the derivative of optimal export price by last period's export price equals the derivative of
marginal prots w.r.t p





















































































2 p(FV ); (35)
Where p(FV ) is price elasticity of demand at the fair-value price FV (which is steady-state consumer
price in the non-integrated case). It is easy to see that @2NV I
@pt@pt 1 is increasing in the elasticity of demand
at steady-state p(FV ) since (p
;s
N   c) > 0 (holding FV and D(FV ) xed). As noted above, the sign
of this derivative equals the sign of the slope of the optimal policy function.
When the optimal policy function is increasing (i.e. when the derivative of optimal export price
w.r.t. antidumping duties is negative), this means that the derivative in (35) is positive. The higher
p(FV ) is, the more positive this derivative is and the steeper the slope of the optimal policy function
around steady-state. As a result, the higher p(FV ), the less prices respond to antidumping duty
changes around FV and the slower the convergence to steady-state.
When the optimal policy function is decreasing (i.e. when the derivative of optimal export price
w.r.t. antidumping duties is positive), this means that the derivative in (35) is negative. The higher
35p(FV ) is, the less negative this derivative is and the 
atter the slope of the optimal policy function
around steady-state. As a result, the higher p(FV ), the less prices respond to antidumping duty
changes around FV and the faster the convergence to steady-state.
Proof of Proposition 3.5 In order to prove the Proposition, I use the following Lemmas:








t(pt(1   t)   c)D(p) (36)
, the corresponding dynamic programming problem is:
VV I(p 1) = sup
p2[c;1)
f(p[1   (p 1)]   c)D(p) + V (p)g (37)
Then the integrated foreign producer's problems (36) and (37) have unique solutions which are
bounded, continuous and equivalent to each other. The optimal policy function,
GV I(p 1) = fp 2 [c;1)jV (p 1) = sup
p2[c;1)
f(p[1   (p 1)]   c)D(p) + V (p)g (38)
is a non-empty, compact-valued and upper-hemi continuous correspondence.
Proof Apply theorem 4.6 from Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989). Let Pr denote the set of prices the
foreign rm can choose from. 8p 2 Pr, let  (p) denote the set of next period's feasible state variables
(retail prices) if today's state is p. Then, for the integrated foreign rm:
1. WLOG, dene P = [c;p]: by (A2) D(p) = 0 8p  p and (p) = 0 as long as p  FV . Thus, the
impact of setting prices higher than p on future payos is identical. Then P is a closed subset of
R and hence convex. Furthermore, 8p 2 P,
2.  (p) = [c;p]  P, making it nonempty, compact-valued (closed and bounded subset of R) and
continuous.
3. The per-period payo function, [p(1 (p 1)) c]D(p) is continuous (multiplication of continuous
functions) and bounded (multiplication of bounded function D and bounded sum, since p  p <
1.
Lemma A.5 VV I(p) is a strictly increasing function in p 2 [c;FV ). If the foreign rm chooses its
initial price in the absence of antidumping duties, then we can focus on the optimal price path where
pt 2 (c;p] 8t  0 for the integrated foreign rm.
Proof For the integrated foreign producer, we can apply Theorem 4.7 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott
(1989), as long as we show the following hold (in addition to the conditions of Lemma 1):
1. [p c 
FV  p 1
p 1 p]D(p) is strictly increasing in p 1 2 [c;FV ). Indeed, taking the derivative of the
per-period prot function by p 1 we get: FV
(p 1)2pD(p) > 0 8p 2 (0;FV ].
2.   is monotone in p since for p0  p,  (p0) = [c;p]   (p) = [c;p]
Next, we can show that p0  FV . Suppose p0 > FV . The S.O.C. of the per-period prot of the
integrated rm is positive and by (A2), the static optimum is lower than FV , so that (p0   c)D(p0) <
(FV  c)D(FV ) for p0 > FV . In addition, VV I(p0) = VV I(FV ) since next period's duty is zero in both
cases. Thus, choosing FV strictly raises the payo so p0  FV .
However, we cannot show the same for p1. Specically, consider choosing p1 > FV , with 1 > 0 = 0.
The F.O.C. is a decreasing function , and from (A2) we know that with zero duties the F.O.C. at
p1 > FV is negative (since the static optimum is lower than FV ). Yet because the derivative of prots
w.r.t. price is increasing in the duty level, we do not know whether the F.O.C. is negative at p1 > FV
with 1 > 0. Nonetheless, the integrated foreign producer will never set a price above p, since by
assumption (A1) demand is zero for all prices above it.
36Lemma A.6 Let h(p) = maxGV I(p), l(p) = minGV I(p). Then the optimal correspondence for the
integrated rm, GV I(p), is decreasing in p in the sense that hV I(p0) < lV I(p00) 8f(p0;p00)jp00 < p0;p00;p0 2
[c;p]g. GV I is constant for p  FV .
Proof Let p0 2 [c;FV ]. Then p0 in GV I(p0) uniquely denes the current antidumping duty by (p0) =
FV  p0
p0 . By denition:
fl(p0)[1   (p0)]   cgD(l(p0)) + V (l(p0)) 
fp[1   (p0)]   cgD(p) + V (p), for all p 2 [c;p] (39)
Take p00 > p0. Then (p00) < (p0). Thus, 9 > 0 such that:
fl(p0)[1   (p0)]   cgD(l(p0)) + V (l(p0)) +  =
fl(p0)[1   (p00)]   cgD(l(p0)) + V (l(p0)) (40)
because [l(p0)   c   (p0)l(p0)] < [l(p0)   c   (p00)l(p0)] since (p00) < (p0)
Claim:
fp[1   (p0)]   cgD(p) + V (p) +  >
fp[1   (p00)]   cgD(p) +
V (p), for all p 2 (l(p0);p] (41)
Proof: Dene A(p) = (fp[1   (p0)]   cgD(p) + V (p) + )   (fp[1   (p00)]   cgD(p) + V (p)). Then





= [(p00)   (p0)][D(p) + D0(p)p]
The rst expression in parentheses in negative since (p00) < (p0). The second expression is negative
i the elasticity of demand p = D0(p)
p
D(p) <  1, which holds when importer is a monopoly.
Thus, combining equations (39), (41) and using the denition of , we get:
fl(p0)[1 + (1 + r)   (1   (1 + r))(p00)]   c   (1 + r)FV gD(l(p0)) + V (l(p0)) +  >
fp[1 + (1 + r)   (1   (1 + r))(p00)]   c   (1 + r)FV gD(p) +
V (p), for all p 2 (l(p00);p] (42)
Consequently, p = 2 GV I(p00) for all p 2 (l(p0);FV ], implying h(p00)  l(p0) 8p00 > p0.
Note that if p0  FV , then 8p00 > p0, (p00) = (p0) = 0. Consequently, GV I(p0) = fpg 2
argmax[fp[1   (p0)]   cgD(p) + V (p)] =
fpg 2 argmax[fp[1   (p00)]   cgD(p) + V (p)] = GV I(p00). Consequently, the integrated foreign pro-
ducer's optimal policy function is constant for prices above the fair-value price FV .
Since initial enforcement of antidumping duties is uncertain, rms that assign low enough probability
to being caught will set p0 < ps
I, where ps
I is the stationary U.S. consumer price for the integrated
producer (Otherwise, p0 = ps
I and there is no price dynamics). If an antidumping duty order is







, the price path p1;p2;p3;::: is determined
by the optimal policy function GV I(p) characterized in Lemma 6, since antidumping duties are enforced
with certainty and by Lemma 1 the integrated optimization problem is equivalent to the dynamic
programming problem which is solved by GV I.
1. Suppose ps
I = FV . Since G is decreasing, dumping will cease immediately in this case. Specif-
ically, p0 < p1, p1  FV (since for p  FV , GV I(p) = GV I(FV ) by lemma 6) and p2 = FV .
Consequently, tau0 > 1 = 2 = 0.
372. Otherwise, ps
I < FV and p0 < ps
I. Decreasing G implies consumer price will rst increase, then






> 0. That is, p0 < p1, p1  p2 and 0 < 1, 1  2 etc.
Proof of Proposition 3.6 To characterize the relation between the elasticity of market demand at
steady-state consumer price and the optimal policy function, check how the slope of the optimal policy
function changes with demand elasticity p at steady-state consumer price ps
I. The integrated foreign
producer's per-period prots when duty level is  = FV
pt 1   1 are:
V I(pt;pt 1) = D(pt)[2pt  
pt
pt 1
FV   c] (43)
The sign of the derivative of optimal consumer price by last period's consumer price equals the derivative
of marginal prots w.r.t p
t 1 (by Milgrom and Shannon (1994). The second derivative of prots w.r.t






2[D(pt) + ptD0(pt)] =
At steady-state, pt = pt 1 = ps



















I)   1] (44)
Where p(ps
I) is price elasticity of the demand at the integrated steady-state consumer price ps
I (and it
is bigger than 1 for monopoly). It is easy to see that @2V I
@p@pt 1 is decreasing in the elasticity of demand
at steady-state p(ps
I) since D(p) > 0. Recall that the sign of this derivative equals the sign of the
slope of the optimal policy function. Since the optimal policy function is decreasing, this means that
the derivative in (35) is negative. The higher p(ps
I) is, the more negative this derivative is and the
steeper the slope of the optimal policy function around steady-state. As a result, the higher p(ps
I), the
more prices respond to antidumping duty changes around steady-state and the slower the convergence
to steady-state.
Proof of Proposition 3.7 From Proposition 3.1 we know that in the non-integrated case, steady-
state consumer price is ps
N = FV regardless of the non-integrated foreign producer's price choice p
;s
N .
Thus, non-integrated steady-state prots are: D(FV )(p
;s
N   c)  D(FV )(FV   c). By contrast, the
integrated foreign producer fully controls p. Thus, we can use a revealed-preference type of argument.
specically, ceteris paribus, had the integrated foreign producer chosen to set its steady-state U.S.
consumer price, ps
I, so that ps
I = FV then its steady-state (static) prots would equal D(FV )(FV  c),
no less than non-integrated prots in this case. However, the integrated foreign producer is free to
choose consumer price according to prot maximization. Hence, if it sets ps
I = FV
1+ < FV it must be
that its prots with this price are higher than its prots with ps
I = FV . Consequently, whenever the
integrated foreign producer's steady-state prots are strictly higher than those of the non-integrated
foreign producer. Only when the both integrated and non-integrated foreign producer's steady-state
price equals the fair-value (p
;s
N = ps
N = FV ) will they make the same steady-state prots.
Proof of Corollary of Proposition 3.7 Let fx denote xed export costs, s
I and s
N denote steady-
state prots of the integrated and non-integrated foreign producer, accordingly. From Proposition 3.7
we know that s
I  s
N (equality holds only when p
;s
N = ps
N = FV ).
If s
I > fx > s
N, non-integrated foreign producer steady-state prots with antidumping duties
are negative whereas integrated steady-state prots with antidumping duties are positive. Thus, non-
integrated foreign producer's steady-state continuation value is negative.
In period 1, when antidumping duties are imposed, then
381. If
@2(p;)
@p@ < 0, the non-integrated foreign producer will immediately exit the U.S. market.
According to Proposition 2, in this case prices increase monotonically to steady-state. This




t 1FV > FV , so that D(pt) < D(FV ). On the other
hand, we know that p
t 1 < p
t < ::: < p
;s
N  FV . Thus, once antidumping duties are imposed
per-period prots are lower than steady-state prots (since both quantity and price are lower than
steady-state's). Since we assumed steady-state prots are lower than fx, the per-period export
cost, per-period prots are also lower than fx. Hence, the non-integrated foreign producer will
exit immediately once duties are imposed since prots net of export costs are negative from then
on. Obviously, integrated continuation value when antidumping duties are imposed is higher:
rst, steady-state prots are higher than fx. Second, per-period prots oscillate between higher
and lower levels. Specically, when duty is lower than steady-state level (following a high price
period), costs are lower and prots are higher than at steady-state. Thus, integrated continuation
value cannot be lower than non-integrated continuation value once duties are imposed.
2. If
@2(p;)
@p@ > 0 then by Proposition 3, either dumping ceases immediately or non-integrated prices
and duties oscillate and converge to steady-state dumping.
 If steady-state is no dumping, we know it is reached in period 2 (where period 1 is the rst
time duties are imposed). Furthermore, the prots in the rst period are lower than steady-
state prots, which are lower than fx by assumption. To see why, note that non-integrated
prots at p
1(> FV > p

















0 when FV > p
0). But from assumption (A2) we know that
D(p
1)(p
1   c) < D(FV )(FV   c); (46)
where D(FV )(FV   c) are steady-state prots of the non-integrated foreign producer in
this case. The inequality holds since for prices at or above fair-value price, duties are
zero so per-period prots there equal static prots in the absence of antidumping policy.
Because the optimal static price is lower than fair-value by assumption (A2) we know that
prots are decreasing in price for prices at or above the fair-value price. As a result, once
antidumping duties are imposed, non-integrated continuation value is negative so the non-
integrated foreign producer immediately exits the US market. By contrast, if integrated
steady-state is no dumping, its continuation value from period 1 on is positive since we
assumed steady-state prots are higher than fx and steady-state is reached in period 2.
Since period 1 costs are 1 > 0, prots in period 1 are lower than steady-state prots
(with zero duties). However, as long as prots in period 1 (net of fx) are not too-low,
integrated continuation value once duties are imposed will be positive and the integrated
foreign producer will stay in the US market.
 Otherwise, duties oscillate and converge to steady-state dumping. Suppose steady state is
reached in period T. Then 91  tNV I  T such that non-integrated per-period prots net
export costs from period tNV I on are negative (since prots are a continuous function of
price).
Using the same reasoning, 91  tV I  T such that integrated per-period prots net export
costs from period tV I on are positive.
Let ^ t = maxftV I;tNV Ig. Then 8t > ^ t, integrated continuation value is positive and non-
integrated continuation value is negative. As long as the foreign producer's discount factor
is not too low, and ^ t is not too far from 1, we can conclude that at period 1, non-integrated
continuation value will be negative, while integrated continuation value will be positive.
Thus, ceteris paribus, non-integrated foreign producer will exit the U.S. market immediately
after antidumping duties are imposed while the integrated foreign producer will stay.
39Thus, the integrated foreign producer is more likely than the non-integrated foreign producer to have a
higher continuation value once antidumping duties are imposed. As a result, the non-integrated foreign
producer is more likely to exit the U.S. market post antidumping duty imposition.
B Dynamic Pricing Model with Retroactive Duty Adjustments
In reality, once current duty is calculated based on prices during the period of review, the importers are
reimbursed or charged for the dierence between actual payments they made during that period and
the \correct" payments according to the updated duty level, with interest. Below I claim that, under
reasonable assumptions, the dynamic optimization problems of foreign producers with and without
adjustment payments are qualitatively similar.
B.1 The Non-Integrated Foreign Producer's Optimization Problem With Adjust-
ment Payments
I start by considering the problem of the non-integrated foreign producer with retroactive duty adjust-
ments. The non-integrated domestic importer pays the duties and hence receives or pays any adjustment
payments. To the extent that adjustment payments aect the independent importer's prices, they may
(indirectly) aect the equilibrium behavior of the non-integrated foreign producer.
With full competition in the import sector, the U.S. consumer price must equal the importers'
marginal cost. With adjustment payments, this means that
pt = p
t(1 + t) + m(1 + rt)a(p
t); (47)
where rt is the interest rate, m is the importer's discount factor and a(p
t) is the adjustment payment












t 1   FV; if p
t  FV ;
p






By plugging in the explicit expression for a(p









t 1[1 + m(1 + rt)]   m(1 + rt)FV; if p





t 1[1 + m(1 + rt)]   m(1 + rt)p
t; Otherwise
(48)
Note rst that in steady-state, p
t = p
t 1 so the U.S. consumer price ps
N equals the fair-value price
(because of (A2) p > FV is not optimal). When p
t 6= p
t 1, this restores the dynamics for the non-
integrated foreign producer: current- and past-export price choices aect the current consumer price.
Consequently, the non-integrated dynamic model with adjustment payments is qualitatively similar to
the dynamic model above and the main results are unaltered.
B.2 The Integrated Foreign Producer's Optimization Problem With Adjustment
Payments
The integrated foreign producer is liable for all duty payments and hence its per-period prot function
also includes the adjustment payments. An important feature of these payments is that they are
received only after the relevant administrative review was conducted. That is, the foreign producer
is reimbursed (or charged) retroactively for over (or under) payments of duty made in the previous
period. Thus, the integrated foreign producer's optimization problem, given FV and p0, is to nd the







t[pt(1   t(pt 1))   c + (1 + rt)a(pt)]D(pt); (49)
40where rt is the interest rate, and a(pt) is the adjustment payment for period t, namely
a(pt) =

ptt   ptt+1 = (1 + t)pt   FV; if pt  FV ;
ptt   0; Otherwise;
To understand the important role of adjustment payments, consider what would happen if the for-
eign producer were exactly reimbursed for any over or under payment it made over the review period














tf2pt   c   FV gD(pt) (50)
so that the foreign producer would choose the same optimal price in each period and there will be
no price dynamics.31 However, if the foreign producer has strong enough preference for the present,
future reimbursement will not make up for duty payments today, thus restoring the dynamics in the
foreign producer's optimization problem. This means the foreign producer's costs today will still be
aected by its past price choice. Specically, the inverse of the foreign producer's discount factor needs
to be higher than Commerce's interest ( < 1
1+rt). Since it is reasonable to treat the interest rate paid
by the government as the \risk-free" rate, the assumption that the foreign producer is impatient (or
that it has higher risk than the \risk-free" level) is not restrictive.
Since the optimization problem above is qualitatively similar to the integrated optimization problem
of the former section, its solution and the characteristics of the integrated foreign producer's optimal
price path are similar to those presented in Propositions 3.3 and 3.4. Thus, the proofs for the opti-
mization problem with adjustment payments are not repeated here.
31The foreign producer's optimal price in (50 )is still higher than the static optimum ^ pI in the absence of antidumping
policy. To see why, note that the foreign producer's prots without antidumping policy are (p   c)D(p), whereas in (50)
they can be rewritten as [p   c   (FV   p)]D(p). Since FV  p, the costs in (50) are higher than the costs in the no
antidumping-policy case, leading to a higher static U.S. consumer price pI in the former case, namely pI > ^ pI
41C Detailed Data Description
Name Sourcea Description
International Trade Original dataset International Trade Commission case identication
Commission case number, which identies the antidumping investigation
Commerce case Addition Commerce case identication
number, which appears in the Federal Registrar documents
Country Original dataset Home country of the foreign producer.
Product Original, with additions Name of product under investigation. Description
Harmonized Tari Schedule codes were added.
Decision Original dataset Investigation outcome (antidumping duties imposed;
negative determination; terminated)
Firmname Original dataset Name of foreign producer.
Integrated Addition 1 if the foreign producer was integrated with U.S.
importing according to Commerce records.
Change Addition 1 if non-integrated foreign producer became integrated
past antidumping duties, by Commerce records.
dateinitiated Addition Initiation date of the investigation by Commerce
orderdate Addition Date of antidumping duty order (where applicable).
daterevoked Addition Revocation date of the duty (where applicable).
sunsetrevoc Addition 1 if order revoked through Sunset review.
length Addition length of order in days, as of May 1, 2008.
c cv Original dataset 1 if constructed value was used to calculate
fair-value price, rather than home market price.
(only for original investigations which ended in duties).
c 3c Original dataset 1 if third country sales were used to determine
fair-value price, rather than home market price
(only for original investigations which ended in duties).
Number Addition Count of ARs (0 for original investigation)
rmradd Investigation and rst Level of antidumping duty
AR - Original dataset
All subsequent reviews - addition
Change in antidumping duty Addition Dierence between present (t) and previous (t   1) duty
Last Change in antidumping duty Addition The dierence between t   1 and t   2 duty levels
Last Change in duty X integrated Addition Interaction between the two variables
ar date First AR - original dataset administrative review's date of publication
All subsequent reviews - addition
poi start date Investigation & rst AR First day of the investigation period
- original dataset
All subsequent reviews - addition
poi end date Investigation & rst AR Last day of the investigation period
- original dataset
All subsequent reviews - addition
ar bia First AR - original dataset 1 if best information available was used by Commerce
All subsequent reviews - addition instead of foreign rm information
ar fpet First AR - original dataset 1 if the specic foreign rm asked to be reviewed
All subsequent reviews - addition
ar fpet x integrated Addition Interaction between the two variables
ar dpet First AR - original dataset 1 if a domestic rm asked for the specic foreign
All subsequent reviews - addition rm to be reviewed
ar dpet x integrated Addition Interaction between the two variables
both Addition 1 if both domestic and the foreign rm asked for review
both x integrated Addition Interaction between the two variables
rst Addition When both asked for review, this variable is 0
if domestic rm asked rst, 1 if foreign rm asked
rst and 2 if both applied on the same day
aThe data for this paper are based on the dataset of Blonigen and Park (2004). This column indicates whether the
variable was part of their original dataset or added by me. The source of all variables added to the original database is
the Federal Registrar, through the Lexis-Nexis legal research database.
42Figure 1: More WTO members mean more antidumping lawsa
aThis gure is taken from Zanardi (2004), p. 409. Note the strong correlation between membership at the WTO
(World Trade Organization) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Taris and Trade, and the use of antidumping
laws. WTO membership limits the use of import/export taris, so that countries resort to antidumping duties in order





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































44Figure 3: Non-integrated optimal policy, marginal prots decreasing (a) or increasing (b) in dutya
aNote that when the slope of the optimal policy function is positive (a), the convergence to steady-state is monotone,
while a negative slope (b) means that prices oscillate around steady-state and steady-state is stable only if the slope is
less than one in absolute value. Point A indicates the case of a steady-state with positive dumping, while point B ts the
case of a non-dumping steady-state.
45Figure 4: Duty changes over time for non-integrated (left) and integrated (right) rmsa
aThe graph shows the distribution of antidumping duty changes by administrative review for non-integrated (left) and
integrated (right) foreign producers. Note that for non-integrated foreign producers duties are more dispersed initially
but converge faster. integrated duty changes are less dispersed but take longer to converge.
Figure 5: Changes in the duties over time by the identity of the petitioner for reviewa
aThe graph displays box plots of duty changes by administrative review number. The box represents the interquartile
range and the mean is represented by a line inside the box. The dierence in the duties tends to be positive following
a domestic review petition (at least for the rst 10 reviews); negative following a foreign petition; and pretty symmetric
around zero when both ask for the review, with the exception of the rst review (tendency towards negative duty change)
and 10th and above reviews (tendency towards positive duty change).
46Figure 6: Distribution of antidumping orders by number of administrative reviewsa
aThe graph shows the distribution of antidumping duty orders (initiated between 1980 and 1995) by number of admin-
istrative reviews for integrated and non-integrated foreign producers. Note that 46% of non-integrated foreign producers
had no administrative reviews of their antidumping order. This is signicantly higher than the proportion of integrated
foreign producers without any administrative reviews (26%). To the extent that zero reviews indicate exit of the foreign
producer from the U.S. market, this means non-integrated foreign producers are more likely to exit the domestic market
once duties are imposed.
47Figure 7: Scatter plots of current and past duty changes, by integration statusa
aThe gure includes scatter plots of last period's duty change on current duty change for non-integrated (left) and
integrated (right) foreign producers. Observations with duty changes above 100% were omitted for clarity (17 observations
or about 1% of the data). The graphs also include the corresponding regression lines. Both seem to suggest a negative
relation between current and past duty changes.
48Figure 8: Distribution of non-integrated duties over time, cessation-intent orders and all othersa
aThe graph displays box plots of non-integrated rms' antidumping duties by number of review for cessation-intent
cases (right) and all other cases (left). The box represents the interquartile range and the mean is represented by a line
inside the box. Cessation-intent cases are dened as revoked cases where the last duty level was zero. Note that for
cessation-intent cases (right), duty levels fell drastically after the rst review and stays very close to zero. For all other
reviews (left), there is no such distinct pattern.
Figure 9: Distribution of integrated duties over time, cessation-intent orders & all othersa
aThe graph displays box plots of integrated rms' antidumping duties by number of review for cessation-intent cases
(right) and all other cases (left). The box represents the interquartile range and the mean is represented by a line inside the
box. Cessation-intent cases are dened as revoked cases where the last duty level was zero. Note that for cessation-intent
cases (right), duty levels fell drastically after the rst review and stays very close to zero. For all other reviews (left),
there is no such distinct trend in duty levels.
49Table 1: Distribution of rms by vertical structure for each investigation outcomea




aPositive indicates investigations that ended with an armative determination and an antidumping order; Negative
indicates investigations that ended in negative determination; Terminated are investigation that ended in agreement
between the foreign producer and Commerce to increase prices (without duties being imposed).
Table 2: Characteristics of antidumping duties in the dataa;b
All antidumping orders Non-integrated Integrated Dierence
Avg. initial duty 32.71% 34.40% 29.62% 4.78%
(1.52) (2.00) (2.23)
Avg. duties 20.78% 24.80% 16.52% 8.28%***
(0.76) (1.28) (0.76)
Avg. duties 19.18% 22.40% 16.14% 6.26%***
(exc. no-review orders) (0.77) (1.36) (0.75)
Avg. Initial change in duty -12.56 -9.79 -16.38 6.60*
(1.86) (2.69) (2.37)
Avg. changes in duties -2.43 -1.64 -3.11 1.47
(0.71) (1.32) (0.69)
Percent of duties 21% 24% 18% 7%***
calculated using BIAc
Percent of rms that ever 47% 45% 51%  6%***
had BIA in duty calculation
Avg. length of order (years) 11.8 11.7 12 -0.3**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
Percent of reviews 66% 62% 72%  10%***
initiated by domestic party
Percent of reviews 59% 55% 67%  11%***
initiated by foreign party
aStd. deviations are given in parentheses. The rst column displays the means for all orders. The second and third
display means for integrated and non-integrated foreign producers, separately. The fourth displays the results of a t-test
for equality of integrated and non-integrated means. The data include all antidumping duties initiated between 1980 and
1995.
b* p < 0:05; ** p < 0:01; *** p < 0:001
cBest information available is used when the foreign rm's information is deemed inadequate and results in high duties.
50Table 3: Distribution of initial duty changea
Initial duty change All Excluding best information availableb
Negative 218 (61%) 159 (75%)
None 65 (18%) 30 (14%)
Positive 76 (21%) 23 (11%)
Total 359 212
aAccording to the theory, when the enforcement of duties is uncertain foreign producers should dump more initially
and raise their price once antidumping duties are imposed. Foreign producers that place high enough probability on being
caught, however, will set their price at the steady-state dumping level even before actual duties are imposed. Thus, duties
should either decrease or remain unchanged following their imposition. In the rst column of the table, 79% of cases
conform with the theoretical prediction, but for 21% of the cases duties increased further after the initial antidumping
order. After I exclude cases where use of best information available could have aected the direction of duty change, the
percentage of cases where duties increased or remained unchanged at the rst review increases to 89%.
bSince the use of best information available (BIA) tends to increase the calculated duty regardless of the rm's price,
I exclude cases where best-information available was used in the rst review and the duty increased above its initial level
and cases where it was used in the initial order and the duty decreased in the rst review.
Table 4: Distribution of duty changes over timea
Firm duty path Non-integrated integrated
Ever twice decreasing 27 (14%) 24 (17%)
Ever twice increasing 21 (11%) 13 (9%)
Always decreasing 4 (2%) 5 (3%)
Always increasing 3 (2%) 1 (1%)
Always decreasing, excluding BIAb 4 (2%) 4 (3%)
Always increasing, excluding BIA 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
aWhen the enforcement of antidumping duties is uncertain, the theory predicts that once such duties are imposed duty
levels should oscillate over time for integrated foreign producers and either oscillate or converge monotonically for non-
integrated foreign producers. The rst two rows of the table present the proportion of rm-specic cases with at least two
consecutive decreasing or increasing duty changes, by vertical structure. The following two rows display the proportion of
cases where duties increased or decreased monotonically, by vertical structure. The last two rows present the proportion of
cases where duties increased or decreased monotonically, excluding cases where use of best information available could have
aected the direction of duty change. About 25% of integrated and non-integrated foreign producers' duties increased or
decreased twice in a row. Less than 3% of integrated and non-integrated foreign producers' duties decreased monotonically,
and none had monotonically increasing duties (once best-information-available cases are excluded).
bSince use of best information available (BIA) tends to increase the calculated duty regardless of the rm's price, I
exclude cases where best information available was used in the current review and the current duty increased, and cases
where it was used in the previous review and the duty subsequently decreased.
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